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1. Introduction 
 
In 1955 appeared one of the path-breaking studies on public communication: "Personal 
Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communication", by Elihu Katz 
and Paul Lazarsfeld.1 In his foreword, Elmo Roper gave an interesting, though somewhat 
silly description of the American public. In Roper's picture, the public can be stratified in six 
groups, whose relationships he describes as six concentric circles. In the center are the 
"Great Thinkers", who have developed important theories or philosophies. Around them is a 
somewhat larger circle of "Great Disciples", who work out or advocate those theories or 
philosophies. Next are - in increasing sizes - the circles of "Great Disseminators", reaching 
larger publics, and of "Lesser Disseminators", with somewhat smaller audiences. Then come 
the "Participating Citizens" and finally the "Politically Inert". Roper adds that these groups 
"are not mutually exclusive. A Great Disseminator in one field may be Politically Inert in 
another..." (Roper 1955, xv-xviii). 
What is wrong with this picture, or what is missing? Some questions and objections come to 
mind: What are the "philosophies" or "theories" which are produced and disseminated in this 
way? Is the production and dissemination of these ideas only a matter of personal 
influence?2 What are the circumstances of invention or production of ideas, what are the 
communication channels in which they are disseminated? Is personal creativity and influence 
distributed in such a simple hierarchical structure? The "great thinkers" model of cultural 
development has certainly long gone out of fashion. But what can be put into its place?3
This paper tries to put these questions more precisely and to provide some answers. For 
"ideas" or "philosophies and theories", I am going to put "public culture". For the model of 
concentric or hierarchical production and dissemination of ideas, I will put a model of the 
sphere of public deliberation (or the "public sphere", in Habermas' terms) with a much more 
complex structure. 
                                                          
1 My thanks to Ute Bitzer who has laboured to correct my English. The remaining mistakes I have 
put in later. 
2 To be fair, Roper did not necessarily suggest this. He was merely concerned with the distribution of 
personal influence. 
3 See the following somewhat more sophisticated picture: "Information and interpretations are not 
necessarily derived by atomistic individuals working on their own but are often produced and 
disseminated through an elaborate social structure involving specialized divisions of labor and 
extensive communication networks. Experts and researchers and government officials learn new 
things about the political world. They make discoveries and analyze and interprete new events. 
These analysts pass along their ideas and interpretations to commentators and other opinion 
leaders, who in turn communicate with the general public directly through newspapers, magazines, 
and television and indirectly through social networks of families, friends, and coworkers. Members 
of the public think and talk among themselves and often talk back to elites, questioning, criticizing, 
and selecting ideas that are useful. Most citizens never acquire much detailed information about 
politics, but they do pay attention to and think about media reports and friends' accounts of what 
commentators, officials, and trusted experts are saying the government should do. And they tend 
to form and change their policy preference accordingly. 
As a result, new information and ideas can affect collective public opinion even when most 
members of the public have no detailed knowledge of them ..." (Page, Shapiro 1992). Note that this 
is again a largely hierarchical model. Beliefs may be added or changed at the lower levels, but 
there is no obvious feedback. 
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In my endeavour, I draw on two bodies of research and theory. On the one hand, there is the 
large body of literature on culture, especially national cultures or political culture, on belief 
systems, on value change, on the production and distribution of public knowledge. 
On the other hand, there is the even larger body of literature on public communication - 
which deals, however, mainly with two special, overlapping forms of public communication, 
namely communication via mass media and political communication.4
There have been attempts to combine the perspectives on public communication and on 
culture or public knowledge - on processes and products. Important examples are certain 
parts of the literature on public opinion, studies seeking access to cultural phenomena 
through discourse analysis, works dealing with the "public" or the "public sphere", and 
generally the literature on the production or "construction" of cultural phenomena. In this 
paper, I am going to follow that tradition, most closely the parts dealing with the "public 
sphere".5
My main interests are in certain parts of public culture which I call "general interpretations" 
and "collective interpretations", and in a form of public communication which I call 
"deliberation". 
In part II, I will explain what is meant by "public culture" and "collective interpretations". Part 
III then explains what "public deliberation" is. Part IV is the central part of the paper; it 
contains a depiction of the basic structures of public deliberation.6 In Part V, finally, I will 
discuss briefly and in a very general way some interrelations between public culture and 
public discourse. 
The description of general features of the public sphere in Part III is meant as applicable to 
all contemporary Western countries with liberal-democratic political systems. As far as 
possible, however, I have added some information on the German case, with an eye to 
specifics of this case and to possible changes in the last decades. I have to admit, however, 
that this is much more a framework for future comparative research than a description or 




                                                          
4 However, I am not going to discuss these two bodies of literature in any detail. I will just borrow 
some general ideas from them as well as some particular pieces of information. 
5 Or with "Öffentlichkeit", which means both the public as some kind of collectivity and the sphere or 
spheres of public communication. See Habermas 1990; Calhoun 1992; Neidhardt 1994; van den 
Daele, Neidhardt 1996. Benjamin Page asked some related questions in his little book "Who 
deliberates?" (1996). The late Karl W. Deutsch was an early proponent of a study of culture via the 
study of communication. The genealogy could be much prolonged, of course. 
6 In his pathbreaking study on the "Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere", Habermas did 
not make sufficiently clear what those structures were (Habermas 1989). This paper tries to 
delineate basic features of the public sphere, as a precondition for the study of their change or 
transformation. 
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2. Public Culture 
 
By "public culture" I mean all those symbols and meanings which are publicly circulating or 
publicly assessible, relevant to or addressing a larger public. Public culture can be 
distinguished from private culture, professional or expert culture, group culture or 
organizational culture. In these cases we have cultural elements whose relevance is confined 
to certain individuals or families or to certain categories of people (e.g. professionals) or to 
the membership of certain groups or organizations (firms, interest groups, religious 
congregations, sports clubs etc.).  
However, public culture is still primarily, if not exclusively a national culture (as will be 
explained later). Somewhat simplifying we might say that public culture exists in either 
national or transnational form, which is relevant for national or transnational publics, 
respectively. "Relevant" means: known by, accessible to, interesting for, noticed by, directed 
or addressed to, circulating among  national or transnational publics, but not necessarily 
"shared" by the members of these publics in the sense of being commonly accepted or 
internalized. (This will also be explained in a moment.) A public is a loosely bounded mass of 
laypersons which are connected by continuous processes of cultural transmission and 
communication. To be a citizen of a state is neither necessary nor sufficient for participation 
in the national public culture, but familiarity with a certain cultural repertoire and participation 
in some kind of regular cultural interaction are. A transnational public is also linked by a 
common cultural repertoire and regular communication, which transcend national 
boundaries. 
The symbols and meanings which make up a public culture consist of rule systems for the 
use of symbols (e.g. language) and of symbolic contents or systems of meaning. How do we 
identify these symbols and meanings? We find them in acts or processes of public 
communication and expression (both linguistic and non-linguistic). We find them in the minds 
or memories of people - as symbolic competencies, beliefs, images and so on. We find them 
in all kinds of artefacts which become carriers or stores of symbolic meaning. We discover 
these meanings by asking people about their beliefs, by interpreting artefacts, by studying 
communications and expressive practices. 
Discursive and presentative meanings. We can distinguish between discursive and 
presentative symbols and meanings.7 Discursive meanings can be articulated in written or 
spoken language. Discursive meanings can also be contested. They come with claims to 
validity (Habermas) which can be argued - questioned or criticized, justified or defended. 
Discursive meanings are what is usually meant by terms like "ideas" or "beliefs". Presentative 
meanings are represented by non-linguistic symbols or symbolic practices (signs, pictures, 
music, rituals etc.) or by non-literal, figurative or poetic uses of language ("fiction", poetry, 
metaphor etc.). Representative meanings can be interpreted in ordinary language, of course, 
and works or practices with representative meaning can be evaluated and criticized in 
various ways. But this does not really make presentative meanings into discursive meanings. 
We can argue about the meaning of a painting or a piece of music or a ritual, but we cannot 
make it an idea or belief - even if we can sometimes connect it to certain ideas or beliefs. 
                                                          
7 I borrow these terms from S. Langer (1957). 
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Now in public culture there are not only ideas, beliefs, narrations or interpretations which are 
discursive in the mentioned sense. There are also presentative meanings in the arts and in 
popular entertainment, in literature, in stories and fairy tales, in signs, photographs, 
advertising graphics, in architecture, memorials, public rituals, in consumer goods, fashion, 
sports. The roles and relations of discursive and presentative meanings within public culture 
are an intriguing problem. It could be argued that (especially in modern culture) discursive 
meanings are in some ways more basic and important. In any case I will (without arguing this 
point) concentrate here on discursive meanings and their articulation in public discourse. 
Different kinds of discursive meaning. Discursive meanings can - within modern culture - 
roughly be classified in three categories: cognitive meanings, normative or evaluative 
meanings, and expressive meanings.8 Expressive meanings are about personal experiences, 
feelings, sentiments; they can be criticized as insincere, inauthentic, unsensitive, 
inappropriate. Cognitive meanings consist of empirical statements, descriptions, 
explanations, theories - what is commonly called empirical knowledge or belief. Cognitive 
symbolic contents can be criticized as false or as inconsistent or incoherent. Normative and 
evaluative meanings comprise norms, values and evaluations, or moral and evaluative 
beliefs. In this area we generally find some kind of distinction between moral and nonmoral 
values and judgements, but the exact separation is somewhat uncertain and shifting. Moral 
and evaluative or aesthetic prescriptions, judgements or beliefs can be criticized as wrong or 
incomprehensible, and there is a lot of argument about these matters. How these disputes 
can be settled is, however, more uncertain than in the case of cognitive disagreements. 
There we have more or less established ways of deciding disputes, i.e. certain forms of 
evidence or argument. Although these distinctions between cognitive, normative and 
evaluative and expressive meanings are fairly well established  in the modern world-view 
(despite some boundary problems), we find certain complex symbol systems (e.g. religious 
beliefs) and many forms of spontaneous, unreflected everyday beliefs and communications 
where it is very hard to separate these elements. 
General interpretations and collective interpretations. In discursive public culture, there are 
many elements which are circulating in some way among the general public. There are huge 
stocks of common knowledge, especially lots of factual information, lots of recipes and 
prescriptions (how to achieve certain results), lots of norms, mores and conventions for all 
kinds of situations. There are also certain more general, more prestigious and more 
elaborated elements: important norms and values, certain general cognitive and evaluative 
beliefs. There are beliefs about personal life and personal identity, and there are cognitive 
and normative beliefs about the social world - about history, about basic features of the 
social and political order, about the future (progress or decline), about achievements, 
problems, crises. For lack of a better term, I will call these more general parts of public 
culture "general interpretations."9 These general interpretations are the part of public culture 
that will be discussed in this paper. 
                                                          
8 I largely follow Habermas here; cf. Habermas 1981. 
9 The many things which are denoted by the term "political culture" (beliefs, values, symbols and 
meanings concerning the political order) are of course part of this central area of the public culture. 
But these political beliefs are closely interwoven with beliefs about the general social and economic 
order and with more general values; therefore the term "political culture" seems too narrow for my 
purposes. 
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Among these general interpretations there are some which pertain in a special way to the life 
of the national community (normally understood as the membership of a state, sometimes 
with some special historical, cultural or ethnic identifications), in certain cases to some 
transnational social unit (e.g. Western Europe, or the Western world in general). These are 
interpretations or beliefs relating to the community itself - its current state, its character, its 
problems, its achievements, its history, its future. This is what is commonly called collective 
(or national) identity. "Identity", however, is a somewhat misleading term because of its 
connotations of homogeneity and permanence. Therefore, I prefer to speak of "collective 
interpretations" or "collective self-understandings". 
The following is a list of potential elements which make up those collective interpretations: 
There are criteria for the identification of membership or the distinction between members 
and non-members.10 There are collective self-images: the ascription of characteristics or 
traits which are typical of the members or of the collectivity as a whole, generally linked with 
(mostly positive) evaluations and with collective ideals or normative models and with notions 
of collective interests and common problems.11 Often there are also notions of collective 
honour or dignity and possibly a sense of violation if the group or certain members are 
treated with contempt or in other ways improperly by outsiders, or if members do not live up 
to the central standards of the group. These collective self-images are often linked with 
contrasting images of other groups and with comparative evaluations as well as with 
definitions of the relations to other collectivities (as friendly or hostile and so on). Within 
groups, there can also be feelings of special solidarity, commitment and trust towards other 
group members. Finally, there is the important temporal or historical dimension, relating both 
to the past and to the future of the collectivity:  
Collective memories or interpretations of the past, possibly commitments to certain traditions 
and collective projects or collective responsibilities derived from the past (linking the past to 
the present and the future), hopes and aspirations for the future (not only for the personal 
future), possibly even a sense of a collective "mission". Not all of these elements need to be 
present or be articulated in particular, of course. 
Common interpretations and shared interpretations. These ideas, interpretations or 
representations are collective in the sense that they relate to a collectivity, that they are ideas 
about a collectivity (e.g. the membership of a state or a "nation") held by members of that 
collectivity. Now collective self-understandings and other general interpretations could be 
collective also in another sense - or more precisely: in two other senses. They could be 
common beliefs among the members of the community in question, i.e. held by all the 
members or at least most of them. And they could be shared in another sense: they could be 
held with the knowledge or with the assumption that the other members of the community 
also accept them. Beliefs can be widely accepted in the first sense without being shared in 
                                                          
10 In many cases, especially in the case of modern states, there are of course institutionalized rules 
for the attainment of membership; collective interpretations relate to the interpretation and 
justification of those rules. 
11 Beliefs about political legitimacy, i.e. evaluations of the political system that one belongs to as more 
or less acceptable and worthy of support or loyality can be part of these collective self-images. 
They might be linked, however, with more general political and moral beliefs, which are applicable 
also to other political systems; these are part of what I called general interpretations.  
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the second sense - if people don't know or don't care about the fact that they have certain 
ideas or beliefs in common. 
Public culture - does it exist? It is of course a wide open empirical question, how far collective 
self-understandings or other general interpretations are really common or widely shared in 
contemporary societies. This brings us to some familiar objections to the idea of a common 
culture and to the notion of a national culture in particular. To sum them up, in a somewhat 
oversimplified or exaggerated way: 
There is no national culture that is a coherent system of beliefs or meanings. Contemporary 
culture is eclectic, syncretist, internally fragmented, a jumble of heterogenous elements, not 
an organic whole at all. 
There is no cultural consensus. There are no cognitive and normative belief systems which 
are widely accepted as valid and binding. There is widespread controversy, dissensus, 
pluralism, difference, diffidence, at most some fragile acceptance, imposed by the more 
powerful groups. 
There is therefore also no core or essence of a national culture which would be relatively 
durable, which would change only very slowly, following largely its own logic. Cultural 
elements are constantly and opportunistically produced or constructed, especially by certain 
powerful elites, and adapted to changing political and economic circumstances. 
There is therefore no identifiable national culture with a character unique and distinct from 
other cultures. Because of the incoherent and eclectic character of all culture and because of 
widespread diffusion of cultural elements all differences and boundaries between national 
cultures have become blurred. 
And finally: There is no cultural determinism. Culture does not regulate or direct social action, 
like a computer programme steering some complicated piece of machinery. Instead, social 
actors use cultural elements as a "tool kit" for the fabrication of interpretations and accounts, 
suited to their interests and plans.  
Some of these phrasings are obviously exaggerated. Not all of them may be consistent with 
each other, and some would turn out to be quite complicated on inspection. But certainly 
these statements have some force and make us wonder if we should keep looking for that 
mysterious entity called "national culture". 
And yet. And yet. If we get around in different countries, if we read the newspapers, watch 
TV, if we go to public meetings, talk to people, if we live in a country for a while, try to 
understand its politics, the ways of life we encounter. Even if we talk to colleagues from our 
discipline, members of our own cosmopolitan profession - don't we feel very distinctly that 
there are very real and consequential cultural differences? And if we look at some of the 
relevant comparative literature on political culture, value change, social movements and so 
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on, we find at least some confirmation (not conclusive, but suggestive) of the supposed 
influence of national cultural differences.12  
And even if there is some reason for doubt if there is such a  thing as a national identity - 
what is it, then, that so many people are talking about under this heading? Or what does it 
mean when they talk about something they call "national identity"? And of course there is a 
lot of cultural invention going on, but does it start from nowhere? And do we really approach 
culture as a tool kit, which we can grab at will and handle freely? At least we had to learn to 
handle these tools and this has left some imprint on us. And where did those tools come 
from, how were they produced and distributed or made available to us? There might be a 
sphere of cultural production and reproduction with some regularities and dynamics of its 
own, not completely at the disposal of the cultural inventors. 
Now it is not too difficult to describe in a general manner some kind of middle position 
between the polemical extremes. We do not have to follow the obviously false alternative 
between the assumption of national cultural homogeneity and cultural determinism on the 
one hand and the assumption of randomness or total manipulability of cultural variation on 
the other. 
It is more plausible to describe a national public culture as a field of contention. There is a lot 
of variation of cultural elements, a lot of difference, a lot of disagreement. But the whole 
ensemble is not just chaotic, without some kind of order or pattern. Cultural elements are 
more a repertoire than a definite blueprint for action, but it is still a repertoire with a distinct 
composition. And a repertoire only exists insofar as it is already to some degree mastered by 
the actors - who are what they are because of their mastery of or familiarity with that specific 
repertoire. Contention is widespread, but not random. There are fault lines, cleavages, 
camps, central issues and topics, certain inventories of ideas and arguments to support 
different positions. Despite all disagreement, there are probably some common assumptions, 
some common language, some common knowledge of cultural elements. We cannot 
disagree about everything if we want to argue about your disagreements.  
All this has to be properly specified or qualified, of course. There might be further 
differentiations of the public culture and the public, for instance, in addition to the alignement 
of adversary camps. Different parts of the public culture might be relevant to different 
segments of the public. Not all issues are equally important for all people. There might also 
be some kind of unequal access to the public culture. There might be different degrees of 
cultural sophistication, unequal distributions of cultural knowledge. Some more elaborate 
belief systems might be available only to parts of the public. But all this still allows for basic 
commonalities, certain common backgrounds, porous boundaries. 
In order to elaborate and verify these conjectures, to make the general description somewhat 
more detailed and precise, we need to study public culture in action. We need to study the 
processes where public culture is enacted in a certain way, where it is produced and 
                                                          
12 Sometimes even in a somewhat surprising way. Within the last years, for instance, we find some 
features of German or French policy, above all those connected to immigration, explained by the 
purported fact that Germany has an ethnic and France a political or republican national identity. (I 
will come back to this example, later).  
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reproduced, disseminated, communicated, fought and argued over. We need to study public 
communication and the role of public culture in such communication. 
National and transnational public culture. One last remark before we now turn to the topic of 
public communication: What about the statement that public culture is still largely national 
culture? Is there not an emerging global culture, a lot of cultural trade and traffic across all 
kinds of geographical and political boundaries? Of course there are international markets for 
cultural goods, especially in some branches of popular entertainment and fashion. There is 
also considerable cultural diffusion, the diffusion of ideas, interpretations, knowledge and 
information. The question is whether this constitutes a transnational public culture. National 
cultures have never been closed systems; there has always been cultural diffusion. But 
diffusion and influence are still different from the emergence of a larger common or public 
culture. In the case of diffusion and influence, the imported cultural elements still get 
appropriated within a national culture. They get translated, re-interpreted, fitted into a 
national framework. There are guest speakers, as it were, but there is no common 
transnational public with a common language, common interests, common criteria of 
relevance which could compete in influence or importance with national cultures. There may 
be certain transnational subcultures - with primarily aesthetic or expressive features, like in 
youth culture (heavily dominated by the U.S. and, to a smaller extent, Great Britain), or in 
international science and its specialized cognitive concerns. And in a broader sense, there 
might be some kind of transnational public culture within certain areas of the world. 
Especially in what was commonly called "the West". There is more cultural exchange within 
this area than with other areas and there are more common assumptions and some 
elements of shared collective self-interpretations. The same might be true for some other 
areas. But that cannot be discussed in this paper. 
Let us now turn to public communication, and especially to a form of public communication 
that I will call (following current usage) public deliberation. 
 
3. Public Communication and Deliberation 
 
What describes public communication, and what describes deliberative communication, as 
distinct from other forms? 
Public communication is freely accessible communication, without formal restrictions or 
special conditions for participation. There are many forms of communication which are 
confined to particular groups of people, often shielded by norms of privacy or confidentiality 
and bounded by conditions of membership (in families, friendships, organizations and 
associations or other groups). Access to certain fields of communication may also be limited 
to people of special expertise. This holds especially for science and many other specialized 
occupations. In public communication, all interested laypersons are free to participate, to 
listen or to read and to speak their mind. (In fact, however, chances for active participation 
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are highly unequal, as will be discussed in a moment. But there are nor formal restrictions to 
or requirements for active participation.)13
The boundary between public and more restricted forms of communication is actually quite 
permeable or diffuse. There is a broad transition zone between communication in private 
settings and communication in informal, more or less accessible environments and in chance 
encounters (discussions with colleagues or distant acquaintances, encounters at social 
occasions or with strangers in public places), apart from the fact that many public 
discussions are taken up in private and semi-private environments.14 And of course many 
topics which were traditionally considered "private" and partly banned from public 
communication can now freely be discussed in public (at least among consenting adults; 
legal and other norms of privacy still give some protection against unwanted disclosure). 
There is another broad transition zone between specialized or expert discourses and public 
communication. Scientific and other expert knowledge filters through various channels into 
public communication. Certain results of research at least in the social sciences and the 
humanities or certain publications in these fields are accessible to an educated lay public. 
There are specialized intermediaries and communication channels. The professions have to 
communicate parts of their expert knowledge to their clients (at least clients are increasingly 
demanding this). 
There are several basic platforms or stages for public communication: Encounters, voluntary 
associations, public meetings and the mass media.15 Encounters are conversations in freely 
accessible settings (public places): bars and cafés, street corners, train compartments and 
so on. The relevant voluntary associations are political parties, interest groups, public interest 
groups, social movement organizations, citizen's initiatives and so on with relatively open 
membership, where more or less open internal discussion (and also public articulation of 
positions) is an important part of associational life.16 Public meetings are organized events, 
publicly announced and open to interested participants. The mass media finally connect 
many participants (via technologies of transmission and dissemination, often in connection 
with special markets) who do not have to be at the same place or connected in any other 
way than through the production or reception of publicly (if not freely) distributed messages. 
It is a basic feature of most of public communication that the production of messages is the 
task of only a small part of the public. In most settings there are relatively few speakers or 
writers and many listeners or readers or viewers. For the sake of brevity, I will call "speakers" 
all those who make active contributions and "audience" all those who play the receptive part 
on some occasion.17 This division between "speakers" and "audience" is of course most 
                                                          
13 There are obviously close parallels between my definitions of public culture and public 
communication. 
14 Newer research has confirmed that these kinds of private or semi-private conversations are quite 
important for opinion formation (Schenk, Rössler 1994). 
15 This is a slightly modified version of the description given by Gerhards and Neidhardt (Gerhards, 
Neidhardt 1991). "Encounter" is Goffman's term, of course. 
16 Of course, there are many voluntary associations where internal discourse and opinion formation is 
not an important goal in itself, like churches or sports clubs or other recreational associations. It is 
a matter of definition if we should include them into the sphere of public communication or if we 
should speak of "semi-public spaces", instead. Since I will not consider these forms in more detail, 
I will not decide the terminological question in this context. 
17 Here, I partly follow Gerhards and Neidhardt (1991) again. 
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pronounced in communication via the mass media.18 Nevertheless, also in public meetings 
there are usually people on the panel and people in the audience, whose chances to express 
themselves are not at all the same. And even in other settings with fewer participants there is 
often an informal distinction between people who talk and others who mostly listen (or 
pretend to), even if this is not necessarily so. 
Deliberation. Above I have distinguished between discursive and presentative symbols and 
meanings. This distinction immediately applies to communication. Hence we can speak of 
presentative communication (primarily by non-linguistic means or by the use of figurative or 
poetic language) and of discursive communication or discourse (the "literal" use of spoken or 
written language). There are, however, interesting and important intermediate cases, where 
"literal" language is combined with visual means of representation. Film (most important in 
the form of television) is the prime example. Now film is a mode of representation which is 
often somewhat similar to language because of the use of linear, narrative structures.19 In 
addition, we find that spoken language often plays a very important, sometimes dominant 
role, especially on television. Television news and documentary are often more like 
illustrated speech, and there is also a whole lot of filmed conversation (or monologue). 
Without analyzing these phenomena any further, I will include all forms of documentary film 
or TV-presentation which are primarily "non-fiction" or "non-entertainment" when I use the 
generic term "discourse".20
Not all "literal" linguistic or para-linguistic discourse in this sense is also deliberation. 
Deliberation occurs if empirical statements, descriptions or reports, explanations, 
interpretations, proposals, prescriptions, normative judgements or evaluations are supported 
by some kind of justification, by some argumentative backing, or by some presentation of 
evidence. These kinds of argumentative or evidentiary support have to refer to actual or 
anticipated questions, doubts, objections, and they have to be open to further questioning or 
further objections. Deliberation is what we normally understand by debate, or discussion, or 
argument, or commentary.21
This explication may become clearer if we look at some kinds of communication which are 
not deliberative. Figurative or poetic uses of language, like in fiction, poetry, or satire, we 
have already excluded.  
Mere factual statements or reports, which are just given as such, without argumentative 
support, without reaction to anticipated or real questions, are not deliberation. So most of 
what is commonly called news or reports or information is not yet deliberation. Neither are 
unsupported judgements, evaluations or proposals, nor expressions of personal sentiments, 
                                                          
18 There are a few special opportunities where the members of the audience can "talk back" without 
being selected as regular "speakers" - by writing letters to the editor, for example, or in rare cases 
by making phone calls to TV and radio shows). The Internet as a newer "mass medium" provides 
some special opportunities for "two way communication", as will be described briefly, later. 
19 Not accidentally films are very often based on "scripts", i.e. texts. 
20 We could call these uses of film "para-linguistic communication". 
21 The term "deliberation" has recently become popular in normative theories about "deliberative 
democracy" (cf. Manin 1987; Cohen 1989; Fishkin 1991; Knight, Johnson 1994). I take it that in 
these contexts, deliberation has roughly the meaning that I tried to explicate. This notion of 
deliberation also corresponds to the special meaning that the term "discourse" has in Habermas' 
writings; Habermas has also sometimes adopted the term "deliberation". 
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feelings or experiences. These are already somewhat tricky distinctions, of course, since 
presentations of "news" can in various ways be combined with commentary, and news can 
be framed to make a point or support a certain position. So there will be many mixed cases 
(like those shown in the following examples). 
Bargaining, the presentation of offers and counter-offers and negotiation about these offers is 
not deliberation, since in these cases it is not arguments or evidence which count. All that 
counts instead are incentives or disincentives with which the parties can tempt or threaten 
each other. 
All utterances which do not admit questions or objections are not deliberation. There are 
many ways to close a conversation to serious questions or objections. Among them are 
authoritative or dogmatic statements, which presuppose superior authority or expertise or 
some other priviliged access to knowledge which is not granted to the listener. We also find a 
broad class of communications which seek nothing but confirmation. Here, objections or 
serious questions would be regarded as a breach of etiquette, as a violation of solidarity 
even. In these cases, the speaker takes for granted that the listeners will take his statements 
or judgement as evidently true or appropriate. She articulates a presupposed consensus, to 
sharpen and consolidate it, to confirm the like-mindedness and the solidarity of the audience, 
to present herself as a guardian of group convictions and as a good and admirable person. 
Many political speeches in front of presumably sympathetic audiences, with their ritual 
repetition of well-worn positions confirm to this pattern, as do many every-day horror stories 
(what so-and-so did again and how awful it was) or success stories (how wonderful it was). 
Complaints and appeals for support often work in a similar way, insofar as they presuppose 
common normative criteria.22 I will discuss some more examples for the "closure" of 
conversation, later on. 
Obviously, we find forms of deliberation in all kinds of settings, in private communications as 
well as in organizational or in expert communications. Some of the more clear-cut cases of 
deliberation we find in certain specialized and institutionalized forms, like scientific 
communication or court procedures. If we look for public forms, we find them partly in 
discussions during informal encounters and in public meetings (although speeches during 
such meetings are not always predominantly deliberative). In the mass media, deliberation is 
almost swamped by various forms of entertainment, on the one hand, and by mere 
information or reporting of "news" on the other. But in the electronic media, there are forms of 
news commentary, news magazines and documentaries with elements of analysis, 
commentary and sometimes advocacy, as well as various discussions and talk-shows (many 
of which are mainly entertaining or expressive, however). Both in the electronic and print 
media we also find a considerable amount of reported opinions with some deliberative 
content. In the print media, we find much deliberative content in non-fiction books as well as 
in the periodical press in the form of newspaper commentary, opinion pieces, analytical or 
advocatory reporting, essays or other genres of more sustained argument (especially in the 
"feuilleton" or in quality journals or magazines). These are only illustrative examples; we will 
come back to these forms or places of public deliberation. 
                                                          
22 I tend to think that this is actually the most common form of conversation. 
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The "public sphere". I assume that the whole universe of public deliberations going on in a 
country corresponds to what Habermas meant by the "public sphere". The same 
assumptions that led me to regard public culture as primarily a national culture also make me 
assume that public deliberation is still very much a national affair, taking place in 
communicative structures and processes which are centered in a given country, despite 
many links to other communication processes in other countries. But even within a country, 
the sphere of public deliberation and the deliberating public (i.e. all the participants, both 
speakers and audiences) are anything but homogeneous and in many cases not even tightly 
linked. As we will see in Part III, the sphere of public deliberation and the general public are 
internally differentiated in many ways. It has been mentioned already that the external 
boundaries which separate public deliberation and other forms of communication are diffuse, 
porous and shifting. Before I come back to the relations between public culture and public 
deliberation (some of which should already be more or less obvious), I will now describe 
some important structures of the sphere of public deliberation. 
 
4. Basic Structures of Public Deliberation 
 
If we look at the whole universe of public deliberation in a given country at a given time, we 
can identify certain basic structures which regulate these processes of communication. We 
can divide them roughly into social structures (the social organization of public 
communication) and symbolic structures of communication. 
I will first look at the social organization of public communication, in special consideration of 
those features which are relevant for public deliberation. I will describe five groups of 
features: legal and political frameworks of public deliberation; the social infrastructure of 
public deliberation: organizations, markets, communication channels and technologies; the 
various ways in which the general national public is internally differentiated; the division of 
roles and the participation of different categories of speakers in public communication; and 
finally, the forms and the distribution of influence, and the forms of social stratification within 
public deliberation.  
I will sketch these features with a look at some specifics of the German case.23 Occasionally 
I will ask which structural transformations of public sphere may have occured during the last 
decades or which might be expected. But unfortunately I will provide more questions than 
answers. In general, this will be more a framework for further research than an empirical 





                                                          
23 My implicit points of comparison will mostly be France, Great Britain and the United States. 
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4.1 The social organization of public deliberation 
4.1.1 Legal and political frameworks 
Although legal frameworks and government practices are certainly important conditions for 
public communication and deliberation, I will only mention them very briefly, here.  
Important legal conditions are first of all constitutional guarantees of free speech, freedom of 
assembly, and freedom of the press. Of course, a lot depends upon how these rights are 
protected and regulated by the legislature and the courts. There are also competing rights 
and legal restrictions. They protect private persons as well as government officials against 
defamation or libel. They also protect government secrets or business information. There is 
also protection against invasion of personal privacy through public disclosure.24 Finally, there 
are certain restrictions on certain kinds of public speech which are regarded as violations of 
public morality or public peace, e.g. laws against pornography or against "incitement to racial 
hatred" or similar offenses ("Volksverhetzung" in Germany). 
There are certain differences between the various Western liberal democracies with respect 
to these legal regulations. Government secrecy seems to be more strongly protected in 
Great Britain and France and less strongly in the U.S. (especially after the "Freedom of 
Information Act") and in Germany. On the other hand, there is said to be more protection of 
personal privacy in Germany (reinforced by decisions of the Constitutional Court) than e.g. in 
Great Britain (Köcher 1986).25 There have been some legal changes in Germany since the 
late 60s in this area. In the 1970s and 80s, following political concern about left-wing 
activities, laws incriminating public support for illegal activities and the dissemination of 
instructions for certain kinds of criminal activity were strengthened. Later attention turned 
also to right wing propaganda. Hence in 1994, the denial of Nazi crimes against Jews was 
made punishable by law.26 There have been recurrent controversies about free speech and 
freedom of the press, but the debate was somewhat less intense than in the United States 
during the same period. 
Another important area of legal regulation and government intervention are regulations of 
media markets or the public provision of media services, especially via public TV and radio 
stations. It is known that this can be done by anti-trust measures applied to media 
organizations, by different forms of regulation especially of electronic media (licensing) as 
well as by various forms of public control of media organizations (TV and radio programmes 
either more or less directly controlled by the government or even the political parties (Italy) or 
run as semi-independent bodies; in the German case controlled by governing boards with 
                                                          
24 In some countries, e.g. in Germany, there are also certain legal restrictions to the use of personal 
data by government agencies and by private companies. This is an important issue in the age of 
electronic communication and data storage, but it is not immediately relevant to public 
communication. 
25 British defamation law, however, is quite restrictive and sometimes seen as a threat to free speech 
(Vick, Macpherson 1997). 
26 There have also been some very controversial recent decisions of the Constitutional Court in this 
area, concerning the interpretation of the freedom of assembly (the Court ruled that the blocking of 
streets or gateways through sit-ins could not be legally classified as "force" or "violence") and 
freedom of expression (when the Court decided that the statement "(all) soldiers are murders" 
could not be prosecuted as defamatory as long as it was not directed to individual soldiers). 
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representatives of political parties and important social groups). In another momentous 
decision, in 1984 the German Constitutional Court ruled that licensing of private TV and radio 
stations should be permissible under the condition that there would be a guaranteed role for 
public broadcasting and further guarantees for a degree of "pluralism" in the area of private 
broadcasting. The German states then set up licensing bodies for private broadcasting which 
are supposed to fulfill this obligation. Private channels have since multiplied. The effects of 
the "pluralism" requirements are somewhat unclear and the position of the public channels 
has been diminished in terms of audiences. But the existence of the public channels 
(financed in part by user fees) and a still relatively strong influence of these channels seems 
legally secured for the time being. 
 
4.1.2 Organizations, markets, communication channels and technologies 
If we leave aside those parts of public deliberation which take place in informal encounters or 
voluntary associations and about which we have hardly any systematic information, we have 
to look at meetings and at the mass media as spaces of deliberation. These forms of public 
deliberation are supported by a complex and wide-ranging social infrastructure. Let me 
mention the most important parts of this infrastructure. 
− Organizations and associations which specialize in public deliberation (apart from mass 
media organizations, which we will consider separately): There are many organizations 
which see it as their mission to make contributions to public deliberation - either in the way 
of actually producing ideas or messages "in-house", or more often as organizers of public 
events, as mediators or disseminators. To name just a few: In Germany, there is a 
network of public or semi-public institutions for "political education" or more generally 
"adult education" ("Politische Bildung", "Erwachsenenbildung"), among them 
"Volkshochschulen", "Landeszentralen für politische Bildung" and others. They organize 
lectures, conferences, seminars. There are also foundations and "academies", mostly 
linked to political parties, trade unions or churches (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, Evangelische Akademien and so on), who also run programs of public or 
semi-public conferences, lectures and seminars. Some of them also support or organize 
original research on "relevant" questions. Sometimes, city governments organize public 
events with prominent speakers to ventilate current topics ("Römerberggespräche"). Other 
cultural institutions which are funded by state or city governments also sometimes 
organize public lectures or debates. Audiences are mostly small, especially compared to 
mass media audiences, but they probably comprise some of the more active parts of the 
public. 
A newer phenomenon are social movement organizations or public interest groups who 
specialize in opinion making, usually in a very professional way, with a professional staff, 
occasionally staging spectacular, attention getting performances, and sometimes 
operating on an international level. The most successful example is Greenpeace, of 
course. 
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There are some descriptions of the rising public influence of "think tanks" in the United 
States and Great Britain.27 These are institutes or foundations for policy research, which 
fund or organize research, public conferences, publications, press releases, sometimes 
do seminars or briefings for politicians and present their representatives as experts to the 
mass media. There are no comparable organizations with comparable influence in 
Germany.28 There are some institutes for policy research outside the university system 
(e.g. Institutes for Peace Research, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). But their work is 
primarily academic, often directed at policy makers, and these institutions are generally 
not very visible to a larger public.29
− Organizations and associations with various functions, and for which public 
communication is an important task: There is an array of organizations which seek to 
influence public opinion, without making this their only basic task. Among them are 
political parties, interest groups, social movement organizations, churches or other 
religious associations, but also government offices and private firms. These organizations 
usually try to get their messages into the mass media via influence on journalists and 
press releases, sometimes by own publications or paid advertisements. There has 
probably been a general increase in this kind of activity over the last decades and also an 
increase in the level of professionalization: many organizations employ specialized staff 
for "public relations". Research has shown that these organizations or institutions and 
their officials are very strongly represented in the mass media (Gerhards 1996). 
Apart from governments and administrations, two other governmental institutions are of 
particular interest here: parliaments and courts. Both are rather deliberative in their 
internal proceedings, following strict rules. In both cases, deliberations are in the public 
eye. How much? Public interest in debates of the German national parliament is 
somewhat unclear. Debates are reported in the press, important debates are transmitted 
on radio and TV. But these debates rarely seem to grip the attention of the nation, as it 
were (as sometimes was the case, in my recollection, in the 60s).30 Court proceedings are 
not transmitted via TV in Germany (and would not be even if this were allowed, because 
German court procedures are usually quite dull). But rulings and opinions of the superiour 
courts, especially the Constitutional Court, have been the subject of some very intense 
public controversies in Germany, and some Justices (members of the Constitutional 
Court) have become public figures in their own right and prominent contributors to public 
debates. Even if the public role of courts in Germany does not come close to their role in 
the United States, it is stronger than in other Western liberal democracies. 
                                                          
27 Über die Rolle von "think tanks" in den USA vgl. Smith 1991, Ricci 1992; in GB Kandiah, Seldon 
1996; Stone 1996. 
28 In France, the Science Po may come close to a similar public role. 
29 This difference may be partly explained by the traditionally greater emphasis on private donorship 
and entrepreneurship in these areas, especially in the U.S. and a stronger tradition that sees the 
social sciences as an instrument of social reform. 
30 Nor does this seem to be the case in other Western democracies. An exception were certain 
congressional hearings in the U.S. (especially the Watergate, Iran-Contra and Hill-Thomas 
hearings), whose special dramatic quality made them national public events - or spectacles. But 
these hearings are more like judicial proceedings (without most of the procedural protections for 
the participants, by the way, which are applied in regular courts) than like parliamentiary debates. 
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Finally, the universities and scientific research institutes: They certainly have indirect 
public influence via their educational functions and as producers of research, but in 
Germany they do not seem to have a very influential public role as institutions (as different 
from the influence of individual scholars or of scientific disciplines).31 There are no 
university presses, there is no visible leadership, comparable to American university 
presidents. Prominent public events (meetings, speeches, conferences of general 
interest) are rare, and there are no universities with exceptional prestige and visibility 
which could give special institutional significance to public utterances of their members. 
(For explanations of these facts, one might look at the internal structure of German 
universities and at their status as state institutions.)32
− Mass media organizations and markets: Communication via mass media as the largest 
and most influential form of public deliberation has been the focus of most research on 
public communication (although this research has only occasionally paid special attention 
to deliberative communication). I will not try to sum up the results of this research, but I 
will only briefly look at three main branches of mass communication: Book publishing, the 
press, and broadcasting (radio and TV).  
Publishing of non-fiction books still seems to be an important medium for public 
deliberation. Most public debates first become widely visible in the press, but very often 
book publications (sometimes just collections of articles which have already appeared in 
the press, sometimes collections of conference papers, sometimes original contributions) 
follow very soon. There are big and prestigious publishing houses in Germany (Rowohlt, 
Suhrkamp, Fischer) who regularly publish contributions to current debates. The 
distribution system is very well developed. New technologies have shortened production 
time and have made it possible to publish books of topical interest quite rapidly. 
Among the many segments of the periodical press, only the ones who seem most 
important for public deliberation in terms of influence and intellectual content are of 
interest, here. This applies mainly to the national "quality" press - both daily newspapers 
and weekly journals and magazines with general cultural, social, and political content - 
and to the mostly smaller cultural and political magazines with fewer issues per year. 
The leading "quality" newspapers and weeklies are important not only because they carry 
relatively large quantities of deliberative content (in the form of commentary, 
documentation and analysis and so on), but also because they are influential both with 
                                                          
31 Universities and research institutes advertise their research efforts and successes, of course, by 
way of press releases, information to journalists and so on. But popular science magazines, 
reporting on science in newspapers and journals, often done by specialized journalists or scientists 
themselves, and popular books by researchers or "popularizers", are probably more important 
interfaces between science and the public sphere. 
32 Possibly I should also mention the public role of professional organizations (as distinct from 
individual professionals, which will be considered later). Two examples come to mind: Meetings of 
the German Sociological Association (still somewhat more prestigious than the two existing 
Political Science Associations) are staged as public events and are reported in the national press, 
but mostly in a certain ironic tone and with some criticism (saying, that the social scientists again 
failed to predict or explain important developments, and so on). This may reflect a certain 
disillusionment with the social sciences after higher hopes in the sixties. German lawyers have a 
regular national meeting (Juristentag), where they authoritatively pronounce on legal 
developments. 
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respect to other media (i.e. journalists working for other media) and for the orientation of 
political (and presumably social and cultural) elites (Wittkämper et al. 1992).  
In Germany, there have only been modest changes in this area during the last three 
decades. There is something like a stable pluralism of leading national newspapers with 
different political orientations which can be neatly ordered from right to left (Die Welt, FAZ, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, with the "Tageszeitung" as a newcomer in 
the 70s and somewhat special role as the mouthpiece of a certain milieu, despite its 
relatively low circulation). Among the weekly magazines and journals, the vaguely left-
liberal, muck-raking magazine "Der Spiegel" and the more sedate left-liberal journal "Die 
Zeit" have kept their leading roles, even if "Der Spiegel" has come into fierce competition 
with the newer magazine "Focus" (which has less intellectual content, briefer reporting, 
and lays more stress on consumer advice) and "Die Zeit" has got some competition from 
the more pointedly left-liberal "Die Woche" (which has some roots in the former GDR). 
There are also some conservative weeklies (Welt am Sonntag, Rheinischer Merkur/Christ 
und Welt, and as a special case the "Bayernkurier", close to the CSU) which seem to 
have changed little.  
Concentration of newspaper ownership, much debated after '68 (because of the perceived 
dominant and pernicious influence of the conservative Springer publishing house) does 
not seem to be a very big concern, recently. Newspaper monopolies are mainly a problem 
at the level of regional papers. The national newspapers have some modest internal 
pluralism, especially in the feuilleton and other special sections, while there is mostly a 
definite line in editorials and also a visible political direction in the selection and 
presentation of news. There are no regular op-ed pages, but some newspapers (e.g. the 
FAZ) more or less regularly present "guest commentators". 
The field of political and cultural magazines seems to be comparatively thin in Germany, 
with respect to a number of periodicals and to circulation. There are a few intellectual 
magazines with some repute (e.g. Lettre International, Merkur, Kursbuch, Freibeuter), but 
comparable magazines in the U.S. and in France seem more numerous or more 
influential, some of them playing the role of intellectual opinion leaders (e.g. the New York 
Review of Books or The New Republic in the U.S.).33 This phenomenon may be partly 
explained by the important role of the feuilleton in German quality newspapers and 
weeklies. There we find similar content as in intellectual magazines elsewhere.34
In the are of television and radio, we find in Germany, like elsewhere, a huge 
multiplication of channels as a result of satellite and cable transmission and of the 
admission of private stations. As I already explained, there is a regulatory mechanism 
                                                          
33 A recent compilation of "influential intellectual periodicals" in the US lists the following: The 
American Prospect, The American Spectator, The Atlantic, Commentary, Daedalus, Dissent, 
Foreign Affairs, Harper's, The Nation, National Review, The New Criterion, The New Republic, The 
New York Review of Books, The New York Times Book Review, The New Yorker, Partisan 
Review, The Public Interest, Salmagundi, Science, The Washington Monthly (Brint 1994, 156). 
Some of them have international readerships. The small band of German intellectual magazines 
does not seem quite comparable. 
34 One might ask whether the relatively small number and readership of intellectual magazines in 
Germany has a negative effect on cultural and intellectual innovation. This is pure conjecture, of 
course. 
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working which is supposed to guarantee the existence of public channels as well as some 
kind of pluralism in programming, and which also sets some limits on advertising and 
forbids serious pornography or the depiction of extreme violence. 
Critics of these developments have usually concentrated on three features: the influence 
of private media monopolies, increasing commercialization, and fragmentation of the 
public sphere. The first concern I will leave aside for the moment. Commercialization is 
suspected of lowering quality levels and of driving out serious content in favour of 
entertainment. With respect to news reporting this could mean a development towards 
"infotainment", where the boundaries between "fact" and "fiction" become more blurred 
and in any case entertainment values become dominant in the selection and presentation 
of news. However there is no reliable information on whether such a development really 
has taken place in German TV. At least on the public channels this is not apparent. TV 
and radio have somewhat limited space for deliberation anyway and always had. 
Deliberative content can be found in news commentary (usually extremely brief), reporting 
of opinions (also brief), in documentaries, news magazines with more analytical reporting, 
and in discussions and talk shows (most of which, however, are more geared to 
entertainment than to serious debate). Public channels present more news reporting as 
well as programmes with some deliberative character than do most private channels 
(except some specialized news channels). Public channels in Germany have of course 
lost viewers to private competitors, but I have not yet seen data indicating if this has 
meant a general change in viewer interest from information and deliberation to 
entertainment.35  
As to the third concern, there is some debate whether the proliferation of channels 
actually causes a "fragmentation" of the public sphere.36 But it is not obvious why a large 
number of newspapers should be a good thing while a large number of TV programs 
should be problematic. Do people lack common reference points for informal discussions 
if they do not watch the same TV programs any more? Not if news programs still present 
very similar contents. Not if people have similar concerns and interests and are able to 
pick the informations and debates they are interested in. This assumption is problematic, 
of course. But there may be other, more important influences on the differentiation or 
segmentation of the public than the multiplication of TV channels. I will discuss this 
question later. 
− The role of interactive media: We could call telephone services and electronic data nets 
"interactive media" (Markus 1987), because they allow for two-way communication or 
conferencing. Now it is not clear to me if telephone and FAX had an important influence 
on public deliberation.37 What about the Internet? Large parts of the Internet are not truely 
interactive, of course. It is possible to choose between lots of web sites (in this respect, 
cable TV and the Internet seem slowly to converge - even if web sites are more or less 
                                                          
35 One recent poll found that a majority of viewers judged the public channels best overall and 
strongest in the fields of news and information, and that interest in TV-entertainment was declining 
somewhat, with increasing interest in news and nature documentaries (EMNID Survey August 97, 
n=1004, reported in TV TODAY 20/97, 256-58) 
36 Katz (1996) takes Israel as an example. 
37 I think the influence of the photocopier is somewhat underrated, but its main impact was in the field 
of scientific and business communication. The same probably holds for e-mail, up to now. 
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available on demand) and to manoeuver within them, but not to talk back. This "one-way" 
side of the Internet might become relevant one day not only to entertainment or 
specialized information, but also to news (which are of course already available, in 
somewhat limited formats) and commentary, but that remains to be seen. I am not sure if 
this would mean a profound change in the character of public communication. What about 
interactive uses - newsgroups or user groups, discussion forums, bulletin boards etc.? 
These mean a further blurring of boundaries between public and private communications 
here, since communication can be fitted to user groups or audiences of all sizes. There 
are optimistic and pessimistic views. Optimistic visions stress the interactive possibilities 
of the medium and the possibility to establish communication channels for particular 
publics ("electronic town meetings"). Pessimists again see dangers of commercialization, 
fragmentation and unequal access.38 Once again, not too much is known empirically. 
There are some reports on the popularity of these things, but there is little information 
about contents of interactive uses and about behaviours of users.39 What is known (Crane 
1996, Buchstein 1996) points to a problem for which the label "fragmentation" is 
somewhat misleading. The problem lies exactly in the "egalitarian" character of Internet 
use, in the ease of access. From this follows a lack of selectivity, a lack of social control, a 
lack of orientation and guidance for users (both in interactive and non-interactive uses). 
There are not enough gate keepers and editors, so far. The result is too much noise, 
overload, too much garbage floating around, a lack of orientation in finding useful 
materials. There could be remedies, of course; but in some respects these might move 
the Internet in the direction of more traditional media.40 
− Circles and networks of speakers. Another element in the social infrastructure of public 
communication are social networks or circles of potential contributors. They apparently 
exist around journals, magazines and feuilletons, as well as around certain radio and TV 
programmes, and they might exist also independently, as networks or milieus of 
intellectuals, academics, or people working in various cultural fields.  
One peculiar and interesting indication manifestation of such networks are public petitions 
or manifestos ("Appelle"), which are signed by smaller or larger groups of people and are 
more or less regularly used in Germany (although apparently on a much lesser scale than 
in France) (Sirinelli 1996).41
After looking at these organizational structures and communication channels we might 
ask about the relative importance of different channels for public deliberation. I will risk 
only one conjecture here: that the print media are still the most important form. As we 
know from opinion reserach, TV for most people is the most important and most credible 
source of political information. But is it also the most important form of  participation in 
                                                          
38 For an extensive discussion of optimistic and pessimistic expectations with respect to political 
effects of Internet use, see Buchstein 1996. 
39 In Germany, some political groups, especially some right wing fringe groups seem to use the 
Internet for their purposes, and the Internet seems quite useful for these "associational" forms of 
communication. But again, there is little information on actual use. 
40 Search engines which cannot discriminate for quality will not do the job. 
41 It would be a fascinating research task to find out how these manifestos are created and how the 
signatures are gathered. Who is asked by whom? And what is relevant for the decision to sign - the 
content, the other signatories? 
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public deliberation? This seems somewhat doubtful, as intellectual content of TV 
programming (and radio programmes) seems rather limited. Especially new ideas or 
arguments are much more often first presented in print than in the electronic media. This 
not only seems to be the case because most TV programmes aim at larger audiences 
(whereas print media at least for now can more easily target smaller audiences - 
interested issue publics, for instance). It might also be true because of the limited capacity 
of oral presentation, relative to the time it uses up. For somewhat more complex forms of 
communication, written text is simply more efficient and easier to handle by the recipients 
(they can choose time and place to deal with these things). Text is better to think with than 
speech (in any case, one-way speech) or film. TV is of course stronger with respect to the 
presentation of visual cues and evidence (which supports the credibility of its messages, 
often misleadingly so). But for the purposes of deliberation, this might be more a liability 
than an advantage. 
 
4.1.3 Differentiation of the public 
Public deliberation does not take place within a homogeneous public. The general public is 
differentiated in several ways. 
One basic form of functional differentiation has already been mentioned: the differentiation 
between "speakers" and "audience". Among the general category of "speakers", there are 
more specific roles, as we will see later on. Not all persons in such roles occupy them more 
or less permanently; many speakers act as such only on specific occasions and become part 
of the audience in other contexts. Nevertheless, there is some hierarchy of activity and 
influence involved, some kind of stratification. Some people act more or less regularly as 
speakers in public contexts, others rarely do. But even among the people who act 
predominantly as audience (and take the role of speakers mostly in private or semi-public 
situations, among family, friends, acquaintances or colleagues), there are large differences in 
participation. Some follow a broad range of public debates, keep themselves informed on a 
broad range of issues, regularly read some parts of the national press and so on; some are 
primarily interested in a small set of specific topics and sample public contributions which 
relate to these particular topics; some are not much interested in public deliberation at all. 
This is an oversimplified description, of course, but it outlines the general structure should. I 
will describe features of stratification in the sphere of public deliberation (i.e. differences in 
activity and influence) in more detail, later on. 
There are two other basic forms (in addition to functional or role differentiation and to 
stratification) in which the national public becomes differentiated. I will call them "camps" and 
"issue publics". 
Issue publics are communities of deliberation which are constituted by the common interest 
of people in certain issues and their regular participation (as speakers or recipients) in public 
debates on that issue (Elkins 1993).42 Issue publics grow and shrink, wax and wane, 
                                                          
42 Policy communities or policy networks, which have been studied in policy research (Héritier 1994), 
are a related phenomenon; policy networks, however, are not only, sometimes not even 
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sometimes in cycles; they can be more permanent, oriented to issues of long-standing 
interest, or they can be more short-lived, oriented to issues with a shorter "attention cycle" 
(Downs 1972).43  
Camps are partisan communities of deliberation. In public debates, disagreements, 
controversies, we do not only find speakers with different opinions. We also typically find 
alignments or opposing camps or "sides". This not only means that there is a plurality of 
people which hold one of the conflicting opinions or positions. People also see themselves 
as being with others on the issue and especially as being against others. Speakers and 
members of the audience become partisans, see themselves as members and especially 
opponents of certain camps. These self-definitions can relate to a certain issue. They can 
also be more generalized. There are more generalized belief systems involved, which 
generate common positions (of the adherents of these belief systems) on a range of issues. 
And there are more generalized perceptions about camps, "Lager", milieus, tendencies, 
cleavages, front lines, us and them, supporters and competitors, friends and enemies 
(political or more general "weltanschaulich").44  
The phenomenon is familiar from the political sphere, of course. It has also been studied with 
respect to more general values and beliefs (Inglehart). Empirical research in this area is 
normally based on surveys which try to probe values, attitudes or beliefs of people as well as 
their self-perception or self-definition and their perception of the location of competing camps 
in the political space. But this kind of research is only indirectly related to public deliberation.  
Now if we look at the sphere of public deliberation and the differentiation of the public, what 
might be different with respect to alignments and cleavages? If we looked at audiences in 
general, the difference might not be too big. There is considerable overlap between the 
general population and the general public. If we looked only at the attentive (more interested, 
more active) public, there might be differences. And if we looked at the active participants 
only, at the public speakers, things might be more different still. The attentive public (Devine 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
predominantly networks of public communication. See also the description of "knowledge markets" 
in particular policy areas given by Nullmeier and Rüb (1993). 
43 A German example for a more durable issue public might be the participants in the debates about 
environmental questions (since the 1970s). Examples for short-lived issues and issue publics 
might be two debates that originated in 1995: there was a brief, but intense debate (together with 
public appeals of intellectuals and so on) when the "Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels" 
was awarded to a scholar specialized in Islamic literature and history, Annemarie Schimmel. And 
there was a debate (with a very different issue public) about a ruling of the Constitutional Court, 
which said, that Bavarian schools could not be ordered by the state government to put up 
crucifixes in class rooms. 
44 The problem is actually more complicated. We may find (by some method of multivariate analysis 
or data reduction) clusters of beliefs on several issues - which goes with what. We do not know, 
however, how this comes about (if it is the result of some shared coherent belief system, which is 
applied to different issues and generates similar stances, or of some other process, e.g. imitation 
or conformity). But maybe we can find that there are more complex belief systems shared by 
certain classes of people. This still has to be distinguished from the perceptions of people about 
their alliances, about where they belong in some view of the political and cultural landscape, who 
are their friends and who are their opponents. The relationship between commonality of belief and 
sense of belonging (self-location) might sometimes be somewhat loose, especially if people do not 
have very articulate or sophisticated beliefs. (Party affiliations - in Western Europe at least - are 
more stable than attitudes on issues, to give one example.) In Political Science, there is a 
considerable literature on these problems (much influenced by Converse's 1964 paper on "belief 
systems in mass publics"). See Luskin 1987 for a very good exposition of some important aspects. 
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1970) and the elite of active speakers in public deliberation might be more or less divided or 
polarized than the general population, and the relative strengths of different positions might 
be different as well.45
There might also be a difference between the fault lines, antagonisms, identifications or 
descriptions of camps which become visible in public communication itself and the 
perceptions we would find if we asked the speakers in private, or in a survey interview. 
Differences could occur in both directions. Public antagonism might be more fierce, because 
of specific dynamics of public dispute. Or less fierce than personal opinion because of 
standards of public civility or other contraints. 
There are several combinations of issue publics and camps. Camps can develop primarily in 
certain issue areas, but in most cases camps will have common positions on several issues. 
Accordingly, issue publics will be divided by orientation towards different camps. Certain 
issues may be "owned" by certain camps - members of different camps will have somewhat 
different distributions of concerns. One camp may be more interested in problems of crime 
and family break-up, another in environmental questions. Only some issues become equally 
important for opposing camps (e.g. abortion, or immigration).46
Both camps and issue publics sometimes develop specialized communication channels 
(magazines, meetings and conferences, newsletters oriented to the issue or issue area in 
question). In addition, some issue publics can develop into social movements, if parts of their 
membership more or less regularly "take to the streets". To put it another way, social 
movements are also the core of certain issue publics. The German environmental movement 
and the feminist movement are examples.47 In these cases, issue publics heavily overlap 
with "camps" - it is mostly a certain camp within an issue public that shares certain 
communication channels. But also camps which are not linked to movements may have their 
own infrastructure for communication. This is most pronounced in the case of camps with an 
"extremist" political orientation, which are also often somewhat isolated. In Germany, there 
used to be (and to a smaller degree still is) a press that was published by radical left wing 
groups, and the extreme political right still has its own journals (the weekly "Deutsche 
Nationalzeitung", circulation 120 000, being the most prominent example). There is also a 
more or less distinct camp that is close to the Green Party and uses the Berlin based 
"Tageszeitung" (taz) as a medium of debate and orientation. Some more intellectually 
oriented conservative milieus use magazines like "Criticon" and "Junge Freiheit". Other 
intellectual magazines with a progressive orientation will probably have overlapping 
readerships dominated by left-liberal orientations (Kursbuch, "links", Neue 
Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte (closer to the SPD), Kommune (closer to the Green Party)), 
although empirical data are lacking. The major national newspapers in Germany have of 
course a distinct political profile (Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, FAZ, Die 
Welt - roughly from left to right), even if they are internally somewhat pluralistic, if very 
modestly so, and not officially linked to political parties. But they cover a somewhat broader 
                                                          
45 See the common assumption, in the case of the U.S., that the convictions of the "media elite" are 
distinctly more liberal than the beliefs of the general population; cf. Rothman, Lichter, Lichter 1991. 
But see Gans 1985, and Schönbach, Stürzebrecher, Schneider 1994 for different views. 
46 This is familiar from the study of party politics (Budge, Farlie 1983). 
47 The feminist movement, however, operates more as an issue public than as a real movement with 
public protest activities. 
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ideological spectrum and do not really seem to be the "house organs" of specific camps. 
However, this is also an open empirical question. 
What else do we know about these phenomena in the case of Germany? There is little 
systematic evidence about issue publics and especially about camps in the sphere of public 
deliberation - about the structure of alignments and oppositions, the degree of polarization, 
and the changes in these relationships over the last decades. There is much anecdotal 
evidence, mostly produced by proponents and opponents of certain camps themselves. 
There is a lot of name-calling and labelling between them (which is in itself an important 
mechanism of boundary maintenance between camps). And there are some scenarios and 
story lines. I will only give a very brief and intuitive description. 
The topography of camps still seems to be dominated by a central left-right dimension, and 
the development of camps since the late 60s can most plausibly be described as 
differentiations of the left and right poles. This means that there are two clusters of camps 
more to the right and more to the left. The camps within these clusters still have more 
affinities to their side than to the other. There is probably a relatively strong middle position or 
center in public deliberation (if we look e.g. at regular newspaper or TV commentary). 
Characteristically, the center does not play a very dominant role in the reciprocal definitions 
and perception of camps, which tend to stress polarities. 
The 60s were famously characterized by the devision between the "old" and the "new left". 
For a brief period, the German "new left" was heavily influenced by more radical marxist or 
anarchist tendencies. In the 70s, however, these tendencies were superseded by the more 
diffuse, less avantguardist, more culturally oriented and in some respects more liberal 
positions of the "new social movements", especially the feminist movement, the 
environmental movement and the peace movement.48 The left usually united against 
perceived reactionary or conservative tendencies, from certain illiberal policies in the 70s (in 
the context of the campaigns against terrorism) to "revisionist" tendencies in the 
interpretation of the Nazi past and other ideological endeavours of conservative publicists to 
right wing extremism and xenophobic violence in the 90s. But otherwise, positions within the 
left were relatively pluralist, without very distinctive cleavages within the left.49 There 
remained, of course, the tension between the "old politics" of the Social Democratic Party 
and the "new politics" of the social movements and the Green Party, but even here 
differences in public positions and arguments became somewhat blurred, gradually, 
especially after the SPD lost its governing role (on the federal level).50
                                                          
48 It was then that the "crisis of marxism" became a recurrent topic. There was, however, no very 
public and influential movement that programmatically turned away from marxism and communism, 
confessing its world-historical errors, as in France. Or at least this was a less popular phenomenon 
in Germany, with some exceptions, especially after 1989. 
49 The competition between the "fundamentalist" and the "realist" wings of the Green Party reflected 
differences in outlook of different parts of the membership or the potential supporters of the party, 
but in substance it was often more about tactical questions and in any case without wide-ranging 
influence on public debates over substantive issues. 
50 This is a debatable proposition. In my opinion, differences in general outlook and style between 
parts of the Social Democratic camp and the "alternative" or "green" camp are often more 
important than differences in considered positions. At least in public debate, it is often not too easy 
to sort contributions from the left into these camps. But I may be mistaken. 
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More serious rifts and cleavages within the left, and more serious confusion emerged in 
some controversies since the 80s. Controversies over the Gulf War (very problematic 
because of the commitments that most of the left felt towards Israel) and then about UN and 
NATO intervention in civil wars, especially in former Yugoslavia, confounded the pacifist 
orientations of the Left. And to an astonishing degree, the events of 1989 threw the left into 
confusion. It is not so easy to understand why 89 should have become a disturbing date for 
the left, as support or sympathy for Eastern state socialism had long been confined to a tiny 
and somewhat isolated minority. But the German left had serious difficulties in interpreting 
and evaluating the events and in taking a stance which could be plausibly presented in 
public.51 In any case the left felt defensive, and debates on the "crisis of the left" started. 
There were also some new influences from the former GDR. Some later events, especially 
debates on immigration and asylum and activities against xenophobic violence, as well as 
opposition against a perceived rise of "neo-liberalism", led to some closing of ranks (even if 
there were difficult debates within the left about changes in law concerning the right to 
asylum). But the scenery is still more fragmented and pluralist than it was before the mid-
80s.52
The more conservative as well as the centrist camps felt put on the defensive after the 60s, 
and some of their representatives started counterattacks (e.g. by organizing public 
conferences). Conservative and centrist public speakers since then have pursued certain 
lines of defence of more traditional values and cultural orientations (self-discipline, 
achievement, certain responsibilities and duties and so on) against the perceived pernicious 
cultural influences of the left.53
Some general defences of technological and scientific progress, of market economies and 
parliamentary democracy have sometimes been labelled as a "neo-conservative" tendency in 
Germany by left-wing critics (Brunkhorst 1997), although these positions are, by common 
standards, pretty centrist.  
                                                          
51 A certain embarassment about the popularity which Western political and economic conditions 
enjoyed in the East (apart from some disappointments, later on) may have played a role, possibly 
also a certain lack of practical proposals for reforms in the Eastern countries. 
52 The influence of post-modern or of "multicultural" tendencies, critical of cognitive and normative 
rationality and universalism, are distinctly weaker than in the U.S. or in France. 
53 Is there a "generation of 68" with strong influence in public deliberation? Conservative critics have 
seen such influence, not only in the public sphere, but also in the educational system and some 
parts of the civil service, like social work, and even among the judiciary. Given standard career 
paths, members of the age cohorts which finished their education in the late 60s or in the early 70s 
should now be in leading positions in all social areas. It is very uncertain, however, how many of 
them have been heavily influenced by the student movement, and in which way. There are some 
indications that many participants of the student movement were lucky, since career opportunities 
for people with university education were still quite good until the seventies. But on the other hand, 
the number of active participants e.g. in protest activities was quite small in the 60s, compared to 
the 70s and 80s (Koopmans 1996). So the student movement was small, even if quite visible. Of 
course it is hard to sort out general cultural influences of the period, which were important for 
adolescent groups, and the specific influence of some kind of participation in the student 
movement or of other public effects of this movement. In Germany (as in some other countries), 
"68" has  become some kind of historical myth, and there is a certain tendency to count as effects 
of the movement what could be more plausible regarded as more general cultural developments 
which were actually among the causes of these movements. 
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Finally, there is a heterogeneous scene of conservative speakers, cliques or tendencies with 
more provocative styles, which are sometimes lumped together as "New Right" or "young 
conservatives". Among them are some historians and other writers which put forward 
"revisionist" positions of the German past (depicting National Socialism as a reaction to 
Bolshevism, for instance, following Ernst Nolte) and who propagate nationalist identifications 
and especially a more assertive foreign policy, often with some kind of distance from "the 
West" (Zitelmann, Weißmann, Grossheim 1993). There are also a few proponents of some 
kind of romantic or even mystic cultural nationalism (like Hans-Jürgen Syberberg) or of other 
polemicals stances against the shallowness of Western rationalism and democracy (Botho 
Strauss). 
Interestingly, however, there is hardly a "New Right" in the British sense, no influential neo-
liberal camp. The public influence of more radical free-market or libertarian positions seems 
quite weak in Germany. 
With respect to the purposes of this paper, however, some other features would be more 
interesting than these descriptions of substantive positions. It would be interesting to know 
not only how influential these tendencies are, but also how strong the polarization between 
them is, how cohesive the camps are internally and how hostile in their relations to the other 
camps, and how much deliberation and exchange of argument occurs between them 
nevertheless. But we have little information about these questions. We can observe that at 
least some public debates during the last decades have been very antagonistic and hostile, 
and that they still are. I would assume that relations especially among the intellectual 
protagonists of conservative and progressive camps are more hostile in Germany than in 
other European countries, that respectful conversation between camps is more exceptional, 
boundary crossing in certain issue areas more rare than in most other Western countries 
(with the exception of the United States in more recent years). I would also assume that 
polarization and antagonism between public speakers, especially between intellectuals, is 
stronger than among the general public. Given the competitive orientation of public debates 
this should be expected. But all this is still pure conjecture. 
 
4.1.4 Communication roles and categories of participants 
The development of specialized roles and the participation of speakers with particular social 
backgrounds is another important feature of public deliberation. There is of course 
considerable differentiation of roles within those organizations and associations which make 
up the social infrastructure of public deliberation. Many of these roles have to do with 
organizational tasks in the background of public communication or with processes of cultural 
production and dissemination which are not themselves in the public eye. Among them are 
roles in the public relations departments of organizations or many occupations in mass 
media organizations, from the roles of publisher, TV-producer, editor or foundation manager 
(who may make important decisions in the background, especially as "gate-keepers", but 
typically do not themselves appear with contributions to public deliberation) to more 
technical, managerial or commercial occupations.  
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Of primary interest, however, here are the roles and social-structural backgrounds of people 
who immediately contribute to public deliberation and debate. Here we find typical public 
roles or communication roles which are located in the sphere of public communication, even 
if they are related to structural positions or roles (occupational, political) outside this sphere. 
− The journalist: The most common public communication role is the role of the journalist. 
Now journalists have very different tasks and specializations, and there are very different 
branches of journalism. The journalistic tasks which are of special interest here are the 
production of commentary, opinion pieces or in-depth-analysis. It seems that this work is 
carried out primarily by certain parts of the journalistic profession. Only certain members 
of editorial staffs do these things regularly. There are certain varieties of elite or 
intellectual journalism: Editorialists and columnists, editors who are also regular 
commentators, the regular members of the feuilleton.54 Some of them have close links to 
the political elites, many have academic degrees and close links to the intellectual and 
academic scene.55 Some achieve considerable visibility and reputation, like Rudolf 
Augstein, editor of "Der Spiegel", or the editors of "Die Zeit", for example. Other examples 
would be the leading members of the feuilleton of papers like the FAZ, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung or Die Zeit. There seem to be fewer prominent 
journalists with intellectual reputation on German TV, by the way.  
Pierre Bourdieu and other sociologists have commented (with some concern) on the rise 
of the "intellectual-journalist" in France, of journalists who assume intellectual competence 
in various cultural or scientific fields (Bourdieu 1994; Pinto 1994; Beaud, Panese 1995). 
The German case does not seem to be so much different in this respect. Due to the 
important role of the feuilleton, there is room for journalists with academic qualification 
and intellectual ambitions and relations to other intellectuals or academics seem relatively 
close. 
− The representative: Representatives are politicians or members of interest groups or 
social movements. They present themselves as speakers for parts of the electorate or for 
specific groups or movements. Sometimes they rely on some kind of formal mandate 
(election, offices in organizations), sometimes they just present themselves as supported 
by informal recognition. Leading politicians are very much in the public eye, of course. 
They contribute to public deliberation by giving speeches, directed to audiences in 
meetings and to the mass media (and not always written by themselves), by participation 
in parliamentary debates, by giving interviews, sometimes by writing articles or even 
books. Much of this is quite repetitious. Who remembers a German politician for specific 
ideas or arguments? Well, there are some politicians with specific ideas or intellectual 
ambitions: Ludwig Erhardt, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt (now one of the editors of "Die 
Zeit"), Heiner Geissler, Peter Glotz, and some others. The former president Richard von 
Weizsäcker achieved considerable attention and influence with some of his speeches, 
                                                          
54 Even if this division seems to be less pronounced in Germany than in the U.S.; see Donsbach 
1993. 
55 A comparative study of journalists in Germany and Great Britain found that levels of academic 
qualification are generally much higher among German journalists. The study also found that 
German journalists are much more committed to partisanship or advocacy than are their British 
colleagues (Köcher 1986). A newer survey among German journalists has not supported this latter 
result, however (Schönbach, Stürzebecher, Schneider 1994). 
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and his successor is striving for a somewhat different style of intellectual leadership. In 
general, however, the intellectual politician who presents himself as the inventor or 
defender of certain important ideas and who writes regularly about these ideas in 
prominent places is a rare figure, probably less common than in France or Great Britain. 
German political careers are channeled by the parties, and talent for deal making as well 
as patient building of alliances and support are better rewarded than intellectual brilliance 
or flashiness. 
Apart from politicians, there are some other types of representatives who have achieved 
some public recognition, like social movement representatives or political entrepreneurs 
(e.g. the late Petra Kelly  - who also became a party politician, like most prominent social 
movement representatives in Germany) or some labour leaders. 
− The intellectual: Intellectuals do not present themselves as representatives of group 
interests with some kind of mandate from specific groups. They act as critics or advocates 
in the name of more general, maybe universal normative or intellectual standards, or as 
interpreters or defenders of more general interests. They often rely on a reputation they 
have achieved as writers, artists or scientists. They do not, however, specifically rely on 
the special expertise they have in these particular fields, but claim a more general 
intellectual competence. Even if many intellectuals are academics and hold positions 
mainly in the university system, and even if they refer in their public contributions to their 
general field, they do not, like the expert, refer to some special knowledge which is 
primarily based on their own professional research activity. In their contributions, moral or 
value judgements usually play an important role (which would not be proper for the expert, 
who concentrates on cognitive or pragmatic knowledge). Intellectuals in this sense are 
therefore not simply persons with peak achievements or reputations in some scientific or 
literary field, but persons who regularly address larger audiences on matters of public 
concern. Both roles are often combined, but of course not necessarily. Not all important 
researchers play public roles in this sense, not all public intellectuals have solid 
professional or artistic reputations, either. 
Germany still has its share of public intellectuals. The influence of literary intellectuals 
seems to have declined, though, compared to the 50s and 60s (with some quite 
controversial figures as exceptions: Günther Grass, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Peter 
Handke, Botho Strauss, and possibly some writers from the former GDR). There are some 
prominent philosophers and social scientists (Jürgen Habermas and, more recently, Ulrich 
Beck as outstanding figures in the area of "Zeitdeutung"), but few scientists (Jens Reich, 
of the former GDR, is one exception). Quite remarkable is the public influence of 
historians (related to the ongoing debates about the German past, its consequences for 
contemporary Germany, and German national identity) and of lawyers (often present or 
former members of the constitutional court, like Wolfgang Böckenförde or Dieter Grimm). 
The phenomenon of intellectual celebrity or the "media intellectual", however, seems less 
developed than in France. Few intellectuals regularly appear on TV (with some 
exceptions, like the literary critic Reich-Ranicki). Not many make regular contributions to 
influential newspapers or cultivate their influence in the publishing business (although 
some do, like Ulrich Beck). 
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− The expert: The expert is credited in public with special knowledge or expertise in some 
area. He or she often belongs to a profession or academic discipline and has often (but 
not necessarily) achieved a professional reputation among the members of his or her field. 
But he becomes an expert only in the public sphere and his reputation there is somewhat 
loosely based on his reputation among his peers. Peer recognition is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to become an expert. (Some acknowledged public experts are judged very 
critically by specialists (Soley 1992).) Experts achieve their image in public appearances, 
and they mostly appear in public because they are known by journalists and editors.56  
− The advocate: Advocates also claim special knowledge or expertise for certain areas, 
often based on their membership in certain professions. But whereas experts are largely 
supposed to present neutral or objective judgements or advice, advocates plead for the 
recognition of certain problems and for support for people with certain problems. Often 
these are groups of people whose members are not regarded as completely competent to 
pursue their real interests themselves. These are groups like drug users, children, people 
with mental health problems, or women locked in oppressive relationships or family 
structures. Advocates are often members of professions who specialize in the treatment of 
certain social problems and the support of troubled groups - professions like social work, 
therapists or parts of the legal profession. 
The boundaries between these categories, especially between intellectuals, experts and 
advocates, are diffuse, of course. This is especially the case with social scientists, for 
example, who often (especially in Germany) see "Zeitdeutung" as a proper task of social 
science, where sometimes professional and public contributions melt considerably and 
somewhat visionary styles of giving "diagnoses" are found. It is, however, probably true that 
role shiftings between expert, advocate or intellectual are relatively easy, especially for 
members of the professions (doctors, lawyers, teachers, therapists, or the clergy) and of 
academic institutions, partly also for members of occupations which specialize in the 
treatment of public problems, like certain parts of public administration or the police. 
There is yet more to be said about the different styles of these categories and their different 
functions in public discourse. Here, however, I can only make some brief and cautious 
remarks. 
Different observers in different Western countries have noted (and usually lamented) a 
decline of the role of the public intellectual or of the autonomy of intellectual and cultural 
elites - towards the expert, or the journalist, or the university professor with his academic 
pedantry. There have also been complaints that intellectuals (of a lesser sort, as it were) 
have adapted to the media, especially TV, have mingled too much with journalists and 
aspired to celebrity status in the mass media.57 The role of the professional advocate in 
public debates and policy making has been critically noted too. 
                                                          
56 Sometimes experts are also called on by governments, parliamentary committees or by interest 
groups, who want them to testify in public. 
57 For somewhat different versions, see Coser 1973; Boudon 1981; Jacoby 1987; Brint 1994; 
Bourdieu 1994; Pinto 1994.Bourdieu (1989) even speaks of "a time when artists, writers and 
scholars find themselves increasingly excluded from public debate, even and most especially when 
it involves affairs under their own jurisdiction. This is the case, paradoxically, at the same time that 
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What do we see in Germany? The type of "celebrity intellectual" does not seem to be very 
important, as mentioned already. The role of the public intellectual, however, is still quite 
visible, together with the influence of intellectually ambitious journalists (and some ambitious 
politicians). Most of these intellectuals are in fact university professors or people in junior 
academic positions. Historians and lawyers, but also social scientists are well represented. 
There are also some prominent theologians (professors also). Most of the time, professors 
speak more as intellectuals than as experts. Social scientists in public roles are better in 
presenting sweeping diagnoses and conjectures than in presenting results or conclusions 
from empirical research.58 The public role of the expert generally seems to be weaker than 
supposed by critics of "expertocracy". The classical case of the academic expert is the 
economist, and economists seem to have some public influence (apart from more direct 
influences on policy making) in the U.S. and in Great Britain. In Germany, their influence in 
public debates is quite marginal. Scientists in public roles often speak more on moral 
questions than on the subjects of their research. The role of the advocate is somewhat more 
visible, but confined to certain issue areas, especially problems of the young (and more 
recently immigration). 
 
4.1.5 Influence and stratification 
Public deliberation is one of the social fields where inequalities among participants are very 
large and very important.59 Some basic ways in which the field of public deliberation is 
stratified were already mentioned above. There is the difference between the general and the 
attentive public, the latter being more interested, more active in the sense of following public 
debates, of being better informed, more knowledgeable. And there is above all the distinction 
between speakers (people who more or less regularly contribute to public deliberation) and 
audiences. 
Now, there are also important differences among the speakers or active contributors, or 
between groups or categories of speakers, which we could regard as dimensions of 
stratification (because in these dimensions, it is generally, if not universally regarded as 
desirable to have more of the relevant property rather than less). But this stratification of the 
sphere of public deliberation is like all stratification a rather complicated and somewhat 
puzzling phenomenon.60
There are three main dimensions of stratification: Prominence (or visibility); authority (or 
reputation, or prestige); and influence. Speakers in the area of public deliberation differ with 
respect to prominence, which means the degree of public attention or visibility that they 
attain. They differ with respect to their authority or prestige, which means the attribution of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
more and more people (technocrats, journalists, those responsible for public opinion polls, 
marketing advisors, etc.) ascribe to themselves an 'intellectual' authority to exercise political power. 
... These 'new mandarins' ... no longer hesitate to assert the superiority of their technical or 
economic-political culture over traditional culture, particularly in literature and philosophy" (107). 
58 There is hardly any public debate where results of empirical social research are important, as e.g. 
in American debates about race or poverty (see for instance the "Bell Curve" debate). 
59 This should be somewhat troubling for normative theories of "deliberative democracy", by the way. 
60 It has often been discussed under the notion of (cultural) "hegemony", mostly understood as the 
dominant influence of a certain group or stratum on common beliefs or opinions. "Stratification of 
the public sphere" is a somewhat more complex concept. 
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competence and trustworthiness by some public. And they differ with respect to the influence 
that they gain through the distribution of their ideas. 
Prominence  as public visibility, as public interest in a person also determines the chances to 
address a larger public and to get attention for one's utterances. Prominence may be linked 
to the attribution of competence. But prominence does not necessarily imply a positive 
evaluation by the public. Prominence as "celebrity" can also be based on other attributes 
which make a person interesting, but not necessarily trustworthy or competent (being rich or 
beautiful or a member of the nobility, or having some kind of artistic reputation). It can even 
be based on a negative image, on negative "publicity" or notoriety. Prominence is a feature 
of the public sphere and has to be attained within this sphere (by becoming an object of 
attention). But while some forms of prominence are primarily gained in public communication 
roles (as a journalist or "media personality", for instance), in other cases prominence is 
importantly backed by status positions outside the immediate sphere of public 
communication: positions of high status in any social sphere are helpful for gaining public 
attention.61 Prominence can also be bought, to a certain degree, by investing in publicity 
(employing of agents or agencies for public relations, staging of appearances and so on). 
Public authority  (or prestige) can refer to different forms of competence or credibility which 
are attributed to a person: empirical knowledge and cognitive ability, abilities to moral 
understanding and judgment or to evaluative judgement, impartiality, experience with certain 
problems and demonstrated abilities to analyse problems, to propose solutions, and so on. 
Having authority gives credit to one's utterances, an advance of credibility, the expectation 
that one's judgements are true or appropriate. This can work in two overlapping ways. It may 
make one's judgement acceptable without the need to convince by elaborated argument or 
presentation of evidence, or by lowering the demands of evidential and argumentative 
support.62 In this case, judgements of an authoritative speaker are taken on trust. Or it may 
gain more intense and serious attention to one's arguments. Authority can have institutional 
backing: being a member of prestigious institutions or being certified by them or being in 
prestitious formal roles (e.g. as scientist, university professor etc.) can improve one's 
authority.63 The acceptance of positions or ideas is also directly influenced, of course, by the 
prestige of certain institutions (if they become "official" positions) and by the prestige of 
communication channels (e.g. by the prestige of newspapers or magazines). In this sense, 
there is also a stratification of institutions, organizations and communication channels in the 
public sphere with respect to prestige. 
Public influence of a person means the degree to which his ideas make a difference by 
becoming accepted and by changing convictions or perceptions. Personal influence in this 
sense is related to, but different from the influence of ideas, because ideas cannot always be 
attributed to specific persons. Personal influence in my sense can be measured only in those 
cases where such an attribution is possible. 
                                                          
61 For "prominence" see the study of Birgit Peters (1995); for "celebrity" Gamson 1994. 
62 This meaning of "authority" corresponds with Parsons' notion of "influence" (Parsons 1967; 
Mayhew 1990), while my use of "influence" is different. 
63 But public authority nevertheless depends on voluntary recognition by some public; it is therefore 
different from formal authority in organizational or political contexts; it is not the authority to make 
binding decisions. 
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To a large extent, public influence is a multiplicative function of visibility and authority. Being 
prominent and having a high reputation are the best conditions for seeing one's ideas 
distributed and accepted. It is not all that easy, though. Influence is also determined by 
institutional location and relevant social connections. Journalists in certain positions, for 
instance, might not be especially well known personally, they might not necessarily have very 
high prestige (among the attentive public or the elite), but they might nevertheless have 
some influence because of their ability to get their ideas published in influential places. This 
shades into another form of influence, which is not itself public  - i.e. the influence of decision 
makers or gate keepers "behind the scene", whose decisions affect the circulation of ideas 
without directly contributing to them.64
There is also the vexing question of how authority (in the sense defined above) or recognition 
are related to demonstrated ability, achievement or productivity. Conceptually, at least, it 
seems plausible to identify "productivity" as a separate dimension, closely related to 
authority, but still different. Productivity relates to the production of new and important public 
ideas. It denotes the extent to which a person makes interesting, innovative contributions 
which enrich the stock of publicly circulating ideas. Productivity should normally lead to some 
kind of prominence and authority (it is rarely the case that somebody produces influential 
ideas in anonymity - if ideas get known, their inventors often also do). But the relationship is 
not invariable. The one who gets the credit is not always the one who first had the idea. And 
it is somewhat uncertain how close the correlation is between acknowledged authority or 
reputation and real productivity or innovativeness. But we can probably suppose that in 
almost all cases where somebody gets some important ideas in public circulation, he must 
have been at least acknowledged by some smaller circle of public communicators - 
otherwise the ideas would not have got into public circulation at all. See for instance the 
phenomenon of the intellectual who exerts his influence more or less behind the scenes, so 
to speak. Niklas Luhmann or Carl Schmitt might be German examples. Their influence is 
made visible more through intellectual followers, who read the more esoteric works or were 
influenced by personal contact.65  
Yet there is further complexity. Authority in the sense defined implies at least some degree of 
prominence. One cannot have prestige without being known. Authority also makes access to 
the public sphere easier and thus furthers visibility, via influence on the decisions of gate 
keepers. But the distribution of prominence as well as the distribution of authority or prestige 
are related to the differentiation of the public in issue publics and camps, as well as to the 
differentiation between general and attentive publics. One can be prominent within a 
particular issue public or camp, without being widely known elsewhere. And reputation can 
be centered in a larger public or in some particular part of it (i.e. in a certain camp or issue 
public).  
                                                          
64 In addition, one should not suppose that all influences on the distribution of ideas are reducible to 
either public influence or to the influence of decision makers behind the scene. Organizational 
mechanisms, network structures, market processes and similar factors, which are not reducible to 
intentional decisions, can also be decisive. 
65 This phenomenon is similar to the impact of professional reputation or influence on public 
influence. Professional influence or reputation - e.g. as a scientist - can become publicly relevant 
via dissemination of knowledge or ideas, which is done by others.  
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Reputation or authority may also be doubly stratified, as it were. There might be a general 
hierarchy of prestige among some larger public (the national public or some issue public) and 
a different hierarchy which is recognized by the members of the attentive public. There may 
be speakers which are relatively well known to and much respected by the attentive public - 
the connoisseurs - without being very well known among the wider public. And there may still 
be another hierarchy of prestige among the still smaller circle of active speakers or among 
the more prestigious people themselves -  among the public elite. There might be smaller 
groups of active participants which primarily recognize each other and compete for each 
others recognition, without necessarily being well known or recognized by the larger public or 
even the attentive public (the "intellectual elite" in the sense of Kadushin (1975)). The 
hierarchy of prestige among the intellectual elite may nevertheless be relevant for the 
influence of speakers among the larger public. There might be a cascading effect. Prestige 
among peers might further the acceptance and circulation of ideas, which might then "trickle 
down", become disseminated by followers and popularizers.66
What do we know empirically about these complex relationships? In a systematic way, only 
rather little. Prominence or visibility might be easiest to deal with. Whom do people know, 
whom do they find interesting? In a German study, prominence was measured via the 
question whom people would have invited to a talk show (Peters 1995). Among the people 
named at least three times, politicians, journalists, TV entertainers and athletes were in 
leading positions. There were also some pop artists and movie stars, who were mostly 
mentioned somewhat lower down the list. And there were two writers (Günther Grass, 
Johann Mario Simmel), but nobody else who could unquestionably be identified as 
intellectual; nor were there any scientists. 
Now these results do not seem to measure authority, and certainly they do not measure 
influence, even among the larger, less attentive public. But what do we know about these 
much more complicated phenomena, or how could we learn about them? 
In public discourse, we hear of course a lot of judgements about reputation and influence. 
This is part of the game. We know the big names, who would be invited to important 
conferences or other public events. (Some of them were mentioned above, when I was 
talking about the categories of representative and intellectual.) We hear that the influence of 
this or that person is declining or rising, or that somebody's reputation is certainly overblown. 
We hear that this or that group of intellectuals is in ascendancy or decline. Different 
intellectual camps accuse each other of hegemony or declare each other as obsolete, or 
attribute dangerous influence to each other. Actually, these judgements seem to be 
somewhat more diffuse, even if equally or more polemical in Germany than in the U.S. or in 
France (where intellectual camps and fashions seem somewhat more clearly delineated). But 
this is also a very unsystematic observation. 
                                                          
66 This description touches another important aspect of authority or prestige: i.e., the value of prestige 
for its bearers or recipients. What is their important reference group? Do they primarily want the 
recognition of a larger public, or the recognition of the members of their own camp, or the 
recognition of the connoisseurs, or what they regard as their intellectual peers? If we want to 
explain the behaviour of speakers in public deliberation, these will certainly be important 
considerations. 
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From science studies we know about the difficulties to study reputation and influence. There, 
it is mainly done in two ways: by citation counts and by reputational studies, based on 
reputational rankings among peers. The method of citation counts cannot immediately be 
applied to the study of public deliberation, since very little formal citation occurs there. Of 
course one could count who is quoted or referred to in public deliberations, and this has 
been done occasionally.67 But the results are very limited, and it is not very clear how they 
could be interpreted as measures of influence or authority. The reputational method has 
been applied in Kadushin's older study on the "American intellectual elite" (1975) and also by 
the French magazine "Lire" in a survey among journalists and other members of the cultural 
scene about the most important French intellectuals.68 In these cases it is of course a vexing 
question who should be asked to judge the reputation or influence of public speakers.69 This 
has to do with the complicated structure or reputation (reputation for whom?) which was 
described above. Nevertheless this seems to be  a plausible way to look at influence. But up 
to now, studies of this kind have not been done in Germany, as far as I am aware, and for 
once, I am not going to speculate. 
 
4.2 Symbolic structures of public deliberation 
There are many symbolic structures of communication which have been studied in the fields 
of linguistics, socio-linguistics, argumentation theory, conservation analysis, communication 
studies  and so on: grammars, semantics, pragmatic ground rules, rhetorical practices, 
strategies of persuasion and so on. I will only refer to a few of these symbolic structures 
which seem particularly relevant to the study of public deliberation. 
 
4.2.1 Symbolic boundaries of deliberation 
As I said above, deliberation denotes a broad class of public communication, which is 
characterized by the attempt to provide some kind of justification or evidence, some kind of 
argumentative or evidential support for statements or judgements, explanations or proposals, 
some kind of anticipation of doubt, openness for questions and objections, recognition of 
fallibility. 
I would not require explicit acknowledgment of objections or  explicit reference to different 
positions to speak of deliberation. But simple reiteration of assertions or presentation as 
obvious truths, with no reason to doubt, would not be deliberation. Personal sincerity of 
participants should also not be included in the definition - sincerity in the sense that 
participants aim only at reaching a reasoned consensus about what is true or right.70 In a 
debate, it is very hard to tell what people are personally up to, and personal motives are 
often quite mixed. It should be sufficient that reasons are given. 
                                                          
67 Gerhards (1996) gives a rough classification of speakers who were either authors or were quoted 
or referred to in the German abortion debate (check). 
68 Brint (1994) applied the same reputational method to the prestige (or influence?) of intellectual 
journals. Lamont tried to track the development of the influence of a single author (Derrida) 
(Lamont 1987), partly by publication counts and some other indicators. 
69 See Bourdieu's somewhat outraged commentary on the "Lire" survey and on Kadushin (Bourdieu 
1984). 
70 Habermas includes this among the "presuppositions" of discourse. 
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But there are certain ways of treating controversial positions as well as people who hold 
opposing positions which put these positions or people outside the universe of deliberation, 
which does not treat them as legitimate elements or participants of deliberation. In these 
cases, positions or opponents are either ignored or merely treated as objects - possibly as 
objects of deliberation (not only as objects of abuse, for instance), but not as parts of 
deliberation. 
Positions can be treated not as merely wrong, not as some kind of error or legitimate 
disagreement, but as absurd or irrational. Such beliefs or positions have to be explained - as 
result of false consciousness, of some kind of mental illness, of bad faith and so on. 
Accordingly, opponents can be treated as victims of false consciousness or manipulation, as 
irrational, insane or evil. In this sense, opposing positions and opponents become objects of 
explanation and possibly, if not necessary, of condemnation, moral indignation, or contempt. 
If one still feels the need to argue against these positions, if one feels the need to 
demonstrate that they are in fact absurd or evil, there is still some kind of deliberation 
towards those opposing positions, even if it may hardly be possible to sincerely argue with 
the opponents themselves. So this kind of discourse will be addressed to other people whom 
one finds more reasonable and sympathetic and with whom one talks about those pernicious 
positions.71 If one meets an opponent who refuses to argue or listen, one has of course no 
other choice. 
In general, the openness of communication and its deliberative character critically depend on 
the anticipation and recognition of legitimate doubt or dissent. Among the most interesting 
tasks in the study of public deliberation is the examination of ways in which symbolic opening 
and closure are achieved and of conditions which lead to openness or closure in public 
communication. 
Among these conditions, norms of civility or fairness may be important. But there are other 
factors - conflict histories, degrees of hostility (which can have various causes), more or less 
open (reflexive) or closed (dogmatic) belief systems.72
But there are always limits to openness, boundaries of deliberation. In every universe of 
discourse, some positions or arguments will be regarded as nonsensical by the majority, as 
incomprehensible, obviously false, not worthy of serious consideration. Nobody wants to 
discuss whether the earth is flat, even if somebody should maintain this.  
This problem of boundaries is especially complicated in the case of moral disagreement. 
There is broad variation in the kinds of moral deliberation - from earnest, dispassionate 
debate with full moral respect for different positions (even if we find them wrong) to more 
passionate controversies with accusatory elements (but still with a readiness to listen to the 
other's position and with some kind of expectation that we could be wrong) to condemnation 
and contempt, when we are confronted with positions which seem out of moral bounds, so to 
speak. In fact, moral disagreements are often characterized by passion, indignation, outrage, 
                                                          
71 Of course there are other ways in which deliberation can go wrong, can exclude opponents, above 
all intentional or grossly negligent misrepresentation of positions or just misunderstandings. 
72 This is probably related to, but different from the readiness to tolerate dissent. Where toleration 
starts, deliberation ends; we just degree to disagree, live and let live. But this is too simple: We 
may be tolerant towards certain practices, but continue to deliberate upon them. 
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especially if we experience violations of moral principles which we think important or if we 
see violations of ones own rights or personal integrity. The recognition of legitimate moral 
doubt or disagreement is often difficult to maintain where not just hypothetical problems, but 
practical decisions are involved. 
In order to give just one example for mechanisms of closure, let us again briefly mention 
some well known German experiences. During postwar German history, there have been 
some extreme forms of public polarization between left and right, culminating in the 60s and 
70s. The right used to accuse the left of being enemies of the state and its constitutional 
order (later topped by the accusation of complicity with terrorism) and of complicity with the 
external enemy, i.e. communism. The left in turn has tended to link its opponents to national 
socialism. Both strategies put the opponent out of the universe of acceptable disagreement. 
On the left, there is an interesting additional factor: the influence of the theories of "false 
consciousness" and the tradition of "criticism" understood as critism of "ideology". This may 
be a legitimate mode of analysis, but it makes for some difficulty in deliberation with the 
bearers of false consciousness. Now this mode of analysis has gone somewhat out of 
fashion. But the more extreme forms of mutual moral suspicion and condemnation tend to 
reappear especially in debates, where interpretations of the German past are involved. It is of 
course somewhat unclear whether Germany really is exceptional in this respect.73  
 
4.2.2 Types of argument. Symbolic frameworks 
There are several basic types of deliberation, or several distinct forms of argument within 
deliberation, all with their specific rules or conventions of evidence or justification.74 There is 
empirical or pragmatic argument, moral and legal argument, evaluative argument.75 There 
are also certain kinds of "metacommunication". 
− Empirical argument is about the justification or support of statements, explanations, 
predictions, or theories with empirical content. Basically, they are about factual or 
empirical truth. There are more or less established or conventional "rules of evidence" for 
the establishment of truth claims in our culture. Pragmatic argument concerns the 
justification of instrumental recommendations or recipes (how to achieve some result) and 
about optimal choices, given some range of options and values, goals or preferences. 
− Moral argument concerns the justification or application of moral norms or the support of 
moral judgements (often by invoking moral norms or principles, which are taken as valid). 
We often find moral argument in the allocation of responsibilities or blame, and in 
defences or excuses, but of course also in deliberations on rights and duties and their 
meanings for particular situations. Legal argument refers to valid constitutional or legal 
                                                          
73 A recent study compared conflicts about abortion in the US and Germany and found the German 
debate much more restrained and civil, compared to the United States, where moral hostilities 
seem to be very strong recently (see the debates on "political correctness", for example). 
74 These distinctions correspond to the distinction of elements of meaning in part I above. 
75 For the time being, I will disregard expressive culture and related forms of argument, which seem 
less important for public deliberation. 
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norms or to legal precedents and applies these to particular problems or cases; it is more 
strictly bounded to pre-given decisions and interpretations as moral argument.76  
− Evaluative argument deals with questions about what is desirable, good, pleasant, 
beautiful, worthwhile. It can be applied to values (conceptions of the desirable), objects, 
actions, goals, preferences, life plans or life forms (individual or collective). There is great 
variety in the ways to settle these questions, or great uncertainty about how to do it. But 
undoubtedly we find public discussions on these matters. 
Metacommunication takes places, when rules or conventions of communication are 
thematized (e.g. logical errors or violations of standards of evidence or violations of certains 
norms or principles of fairness are critized) or when misunderstandings or 
misrepresentations are corrected or denounced. 
In public deliberation, these forms of argument are often very much intertwined. The 
definition of social problems already involves both matters of fact and matters of norm or 
value, as do discussions about solutions. Moral conflicts are often about specific cases or 
situations and also involve both the choice and interpretation of relevant norms and the 
adequate description of the situation and its relevant empirical aspects. The same is 
obviously true for legal cases (Günther 1988). Nevertheless, one of these dimensions is 
often dominating. It happens, of course, that some of the participants stress the empirical 
aspects, while others keep stressing the moral or evaluative dimensions.  
It is interesting to see what determines the predominance of certain modes of argument in 
specific debates or within specific publics, and what the consequences are. One might 
expect that different categories of speakers will stress different dimensions. Almost by 
definition, the expert will stress the empirical or cognitive dimension of a topic (because his 
special expertise is based on empirical knowledge), while intellectuals may often favour 
moral or evaluative aspects, since they often do not have privileged knowledge about the 
empirical aspects of a problem.77
Moral disagreement and moral argument will generally be more polarizing. But cognitive 
disagreement is not necessarily more quickly or easily resolved. Also, distrust of expert 
knowledge or accusations of bias can quickly add a moral dimension to an empirical 
argument. Many current problems and debates have very important elements of cognitive 
uncertainty and disagreement (environmental problems, for example, or labor market or 
other economic problems), which are not at all easily resolved. But these cognitive aspects 
rarely seem to become the center of public debates. In public discussions, either moral or 
evaluative aspects are brought to the foreground (as often in environmental debates), or the 
issues with difficult empirical aspects tend to become less popular (unemployment). In 
addition, it is often a matter of contention in itself whether the normative or empirical aspects 
of a problem are stressed, not least because this has to do with the allocation of 
responsibility. This brings us to another phenomenon: the "framing" of issues and the 
circulation or proliferation of different frames or interpretive packages for issues or problems. 
                                                          
76 Relations and differences between legal and moral argument are a somewhat complicated and 
controversial topic, which I cannot discuss in any detail, here. 
77 There might be other reasons for this kind of preference, as will be discussed later on. 
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Symbolic frameworks. In debates, not only answers can differ, but also the way questions 
are posed, problems are interpreted, issues are described. Definitions of issues or topics do 
not only differ with respect to the emphasis they put on cognitive, moral or evaluative aspects 
of an issue, but also with respect to which particular moral aspect or which particular 
cognitive aspect dominates.78 This has been described as "framing" (Gamson, Modigliani 
1987; Schön, Rein 1994; Gerhards 1995). Often, certain ways of framing the issues will give 
an advantage to certain kinds of answers.  
Framing can be influenced by given cultural interpretations or "semantics", especially by the 
semantics of particular cultural fields. The different branches of professional or scientific 
knowledge (law, medicine, psychology, educational theory, economics, social and political 
science, history, natural sciences) have all developed their own conceptual frameworks, 
languages and typical perspectives which can be applied to or imported into public 
discourse.79 These professional perspectives, with the possible exceptions of law, history, 
education and parts of political and social science will generally stress the empirical or 
cognitive aspects of problem definitions, using the language of the respective profession or 
discipline. This has led to discussions whether a predominance of certain professional or 
scientific framework implies a devaluation of everyday experience and especially a 
devalution of ordinary moral and evaluative language.80
In Germany, in particular, since the 60s there has been a certain conservative critique of the 
alleged redefinition of moral problems and moral responsibilities by social science and 
educational theories (and sometimes of an undue influence of these perspectives on the 
legal profession, especially the criminal courts). Blaming "society" for deviant or 
reprehensible behaviour or for social ills which might just be the effects of such behaviour 
(e.g. family break-ups) is said to relieve every wrongdoer from his personal responsibility. 
Conservatives sometimes miss the point that sociological explanations of certain behaviours 
or problems often only imply a somewhat different allocation, not a general abolition of moral 
responsibility. This depends, of course, on the kind of explanation which is applied. Anyway, 
the left often stresses moral responsibilities for social and political problems and conditions 
where the right tends to see some kind of inexorable logic of development. 
 
4.2.3 Levels of abstraction or generality, "genres" of public deliberation 
Public controversies and debates have different levels of abstraction and generality. At one 
end of the spectrum are debates which relate to specific aspects of immediate practical 
problems and political decisions, at the other end, there are  debates about general 
interpretations or collective self-understandings.  
                                                          
78 See for example the current controversies on abortion. Which moral aspect is made central: the 
moral status of the fetus or the women's right to self-determination? (Gerhards 1996) In this case, 
different moral aspects are stressed. There could be also questions of fact, of course: when does 
the fetus develop some kind of experience or consciousness? 
79 See Giesen (1983) for an instructive analysis how different frameworks, some of them derived from 
professional perspectives, are applied to a particular problem (in this case, drug addiction). 
80 For an early example, see Rieff 1973. 
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Sometimes, general debates emerge from conflicts about immediate political decisions or as 
reactions to particular events (examples are the German debates and protest movements 
relating to the deployment of NATO middle range missiles in the 80s, or reactions to the Gulf 
War, or the civil wars in former Yugoslavia, or the reactions to the events of 1989). But there 
are also more permanent topics, which reappear on the public agenda with a certain 
regularity: disturbing features of the younger generation, gender and family relations, the 
crisis of the welfare state, several kinds of secular loss and decline (morality, community, 
solidarity, meaning), national history and identity. 
There are also - at least in Germany - certain recognizable "genres" of more general public 
debate. More precisely, there is a genre with two sub-divisions. The genre is "Zeitdiagnose" 
("diagnosis of our time").81 It comprises debates on general social or cultural changes and 
historical developments, combining in an often diffuse way descriptions, prognoses, 
evaluations and the identification of problems, ills or pathologies. These diagnoses may 
relate to the "state of nation", or they may have large scopes, e.g. "modernity" (mostly 
understood as the Western world during a certain time-period) or to the fate of humanity as a 
whole. The sub-species are "crises debates" and what I would call "threshold debates". 
"Crises debates" will be familiar. They usually bundle together a range of problematic or 
threatening social or cultural developments, suggest some connection between them, 
possibly some common structural causes, and often predict that things will get worse before 
there may be a chance of betterment (which could only be achieved by some major structural 
transformation). "Threshold debates" are about the question whether we are just in the midst 
or just past or just awaiting some fundamental, epochal social transformation, whether there 
is a new historical stage or a new type of society (e.g. a post-something epoch or age, or an 
information society or risk society, to name familiar examples).82 Obviously the two 
subspecies are often combined, but that's not always so. Now I am not suggesting that there 
is necessarily something wrong about these kinds of debate; I am simply noting that they are 
recurring forms of public debate. We could try to describe the typical features of these genres 
in more detail, we could look for typical effects, and we could ask what the reasons for their 
popularity are, but I will have to leave that for later occasions.83
Here I will only make a few observations: If we look at public debates, not least the more 
ambitious "grand debates", some peculiar features are very often apparent: Hyperbole, 
excitement, dramatization. Orientation towards novelty and towards dramatic problems - 
proliferation of novel trends, imminent changes, dramatic and profound changes, urgent 
problems and dangers. There is some similarity to features of news selection and 
presentation, which have been described as "news values" - criteria by which editors choose 
and frame news stories (Galtung, Ruge 1965; Gans 1979; Staab 1990). Editors use these 
                                                          
81 For slightly different descriptions of this genre, see Reese-Schäfer 1996; Wewer 1989. 
82 "Threshold debates" often go hand in hand with debates about historical "master trends", like 
"individualization" or "globalization". Debates about such master trends also tend to suggest some 
basic threshold of development. 
83 There are other typical, less general forms or genres of public debate. Some have been described 
in the literature: e.g. "scandals", "moral panics" and the array of "social problems". Here, however, I 
will only look at debates at the most general level. Public debates about scandals might not easily 
lead to a more general questioning of beliefs or collective interpretations, by the way, because 
debates about scandals appeal to valid norms and values, denounce their violation and ask for 
punishment or retribution. In this way, they are conservative rituals. 
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features to catch the attention of the public, and similar factors may be at work in public 
debates. 
Simplification is another necessity, even in more high-brow public discourse which is still 
oriented towards a larger audience. This leads to the use of slogans and catch-phrases (e.g. 
phrases which seem to indicate the essential character of important changes - all 
combinations with "society" or "age" or "revolution" or "generation"). There is also a peculiar  
"syndrom" style of analysis: the bundling together of phenomena which are described as 
indicative of a general trend (results of some deeper transformation or at least somehow 
connected links of general trend). This is both a way of dramatization and of simplification 
and the production of meaning in complex situations. That moral aspects are often stressed 
over cognitive aspects might be due to the fact that they are more publicly assessible (there 
is no real expert knowledge in this domain), more dramatic and sometimes (if by no means 
always) a way of simplification.84  
Still, much of public argumentation (especially routine newspaper and TV commentary) is 
rather didactic and dull, often not even arguing for and against very specific positions. There 
is also a large amount of redundancy. Arguments get repeated over and over (the fact that 
the same arguments are published via so many different communication channels at the 
same time intensifies this impression). 
                                                          
84 These stylistic features of public discourse are sometimes contrasted with scientific discourse. 
Speaking of mass audiences for intellectual contributions, Lewis Coser stated in 1973 that they 
"are not equipped to judge the accuracy, the mastery or depth of a contribution, but they are 
sufficiently well-educated to judge a work in terms of surface characteristics of style and 
presentation. They are likely to ask not whether what is asserted is true or significant, but whether 
it is startling. ... In otherwise heterogenous audiences, only the new and the brilliant can provide 
suitable conversation pieces, allowing everyone to display his recently acquired knowledge as a 
badge of status." (Coser 1973, 49) There is some questionable general soupçon against the 
audience. But is not the implicit contrast to academic discourse overdrawn, as well? At least if we 
look at the social sciences and the humanities, some of those "news values" seem to be at work... 
We only have to look at the proliferation of "crisis theories" over the last three decades. - For the 
observation that there are similarities and sliding transitions between scientific and public 
discourse, see also Hilgartner 1990. 
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5. Public Culture, processes and structures of public deliberation: some 
interrelations 
 
5.1 The Reproduction of public culture in public deliberation - some general 
observations 
Public culture, as described above, is involved in public deliberation in several ways. Ideas 
and interpretations which are parts of the cultural repertoire function as a background and as 
a resource for public deliberation, as unstated assumptions and as a reservoir for the 
articulation of specific ideas. In public debates, parts of the cultural repertoire are articulated, 
while other parts remain as an implicit horizon of assumptions and presuppositions, and still 
other parts, which are not relevant to the particular debate, remain stored in personal 
memories (or in "external memory" - texts and other forms of cultural storage). The 
articulation of certain elements of public culture can be done in two ways. These elements 
can be invoked as valid, authoritative, self-evident, and as support for assertions or claims. 
Or they can be questioned, criticized, contested and, in response, defended or supported. 
Through these processes, public culture is constantly both reproduced and transformed. 
Parts of public culture are confirmed and passed on, while other parts are revised or invented 
anew.85
The focus of public debates can be more narrow (oriented towards  questions of immediate 
practical relevance and towards specific disputed aspects of such issues), and more general 
or fundamental. It is in these wide-ranging "grand debates" that public interpretations and 
collective self-understandings are most clearly articulated and disputed. To illustrate the way 
in which this happens, we could look at the debates about "national identity". 
In Germany, a host of books and journal articles about "national identity" has appeared since 
the 1980s. But debates about national identity or collective interpretations (as defined in Part 
I of this paper) can be found throughout the postwar years of the German federal republic, if 
not always under the title "national identity".86 There have been debates about the character 
of Germany in the past and Western Germany in the present, about particularities of its 
social and political system and of its culture and even the social-psychological make-up of its 
population, about its relation to the GDR and the problem of national unity, about its relations 
to other countries, above all its special relations to "the West". And there have been debates 
about the German past, especially in this century, more particularly about National Socialism 
and about the consequences of this past for the new Germany. If the debates about the 
recent national past had been somewhat muted in the earlier post-war years, they certainly 
erupted in the 60s and have been a very important element in West German public debates 
ever since.87 The "Historikerstreit" of the early 90s and the recent "Goldhagen Debate", as 
                                                          
85 Public communication is usually discussed with respect to the formation of "public opinion", which 
is largely understood as political opinion, or with respect to the signalling or articulation of public 
opinion vis-à-vis the political decision makers (Gerhards, Neidhardt 1991; Gerhards 1994). Here I 
look to broader effects or functions of public deliberation concerning the reproduction of public 
culture, as should be obvious already. 
86 I am leaving out developments in the former GDR. 
87 The debates about the Nazi-past within the 60's students movement, however, where peculiar in 
certain respects. On the one hand, there was a strong element of blame directed against the 
members of the older generation. On the other hand, there was a strong inclination in large parts of 
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well as the recent controversies about a public exhibition that documented atrocities of the 
German army in the East during the war are well-known examples. But in many important 
public debates, from the controversies about a West German army in the 50s to the problem 
of the official recognition of the post-war boundary changes in the East, to the debates of 
German unification, the debates about German military participation in NATO or UN missions 
or the questions of immigration and asylum policy, interpretations of the German past and its 
consequences for present-day Germany loom very large. Recently, a "second past", that of 
the former GDR, has been included in the debate, with many attempts to draw parallels and 
distinctions. 
It is not possible to describe the issues and developments of these debates in more detail 
here. Suffice it to say that these are not just general debates about general problems or 
principles of the political order. Universalist normative positions and arguments play a role, of 
course. But there are very strong elements of collective interpretation in the sense described 
above - of the interpretation of the specific history, experience, character and situation of a 
national collectivity. Interestingly, it is predominantly the left, although generally universalist 
and cosmopolitan in outlook, which tends not only to stress the specific features or the 
uniqueness of German history (above all of National Socialism and its crimes), but also 
insists on deriving specific normative consequences from this history, apart from the general 
consequence that we should vigilantly defend democracy, liberalism and enlightenment 
universalism. These consequences concern specific collective responsibilities or obligations, 
from restitution to duties of remembrance to peculiar restraints in international politics. Parts 
of the right, on the other hand, insist that Germany should not be unduly burdened or bound 
by its past, but should behave like any other state, or like any other state of comparable size 
and might, in defending its national interests on the international scene (whatever that may 
imply). Sometimes this claim is backed by attempts to "historicize" or "relativize" the German 
past, as known from the "Historikerstreit". This is, of course, also an attempt to establish a 
"positive" national identity, with stronger national pride and so on, instead of the more self-
critical identity posited by the left. 
What is not apparent in these debates, by the way, is the element of ethnic (or "völkisch") 
national identity which is so often ascribed to Germany - not only as a feature of the past, but 
also of the present.88 This element is almost completely lacking in public debates, except as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the movement to see national socialism in a universal, not specifically national frame, and to 
articulate lessons or consequences in international terms, so to speak. Fascism was to be blamed 
on capitalism (if not on modernity), and the international abolishment of capitalism often seemed 
more important than more specific consequences or responsibilities for the German situation. (In 
this respect, the situation in the GDR was similar.) It may have to to with this point of view that 
parts of the student movement had difficulties acknowledging a special relationship between 
Germany and Israel. But this was a passing phenomenon. 
88 See e.g. the literature about current immigration policies, but also more general pieces on 
nationalism and national identity (Koopmans, Kriesi 1997; Schnapper 1995; Brubaker 1992 - with 
some qualifications). In the light of all the criticisms of cultural homogeneity, "essentialism" and so 
on, this is a surprising tendency. Often the assertion of an "ethnic" character of the German 
conception of nationhood is derived in a circular way. It is taken as an indication of ethnic 
nationalism that Germany has restrictive naturalization policies and still has ius sanguinis as the 
central element of its citizenship law. At the same time, such an ethnic conception of nationhood is 
treated as a causal factor in the explanation of these policies. But restrictive naturalization policies 
could be explained in a number of ways. There are no attempts to establish the existence of ethnic 
self-conceptions independently, at least not for post-war Western Germany. 
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a straw man for the critics of nationalism, and except for some mutterings from the right 
fringe, which generally remain confined to right wing publications. The discourse of the right 
rarely appeals to an ethnic conception of nationhood, but is primarily based on conceptions 
of raison d'état and "realist" power politics ("Machtpolitik"). This kind of statist orientation 
does not need any "ethnic" foundations. Of course there are elements of cultural nationalism 
in the sense of appeals to German cultural traditions, and there are more general appeals to 
a continuing national history. In this respect, however, Germany is certainly not any different 
from other Western countries.89
This example shows that it may be useful to look at public debates for evidence concerning 
features of the public culture.  
Can we also learn something from this example about the effects of public deliberation on 
public culture? From opinion polls and other evidence we can conclude that there have been 
enormous changes in West German collective interpretations during the post-war period, 
concerning the view of the Nazi period and support for liberal-democratic principles and 
practices. These cultural changes were closely linked to generational succession. We may 
assume that the extensive public debates on German national identity and interpretations of 
the past have had some influence on these changes. But so far we have little evidence on 
the precise nature of this influence.  
In fact, this example should be a cautionary one with respect to the role of public deliberation 
for the reproduction and change of public culture. For there are other ways in which public 
culture is transmitted, and other factors affecting its change. Public culture is transmitted 
through socialization in the family, the peer group, the educational system. It is reproduced 
by private communication and debate. It is expressed and transmitted in non-discursive 
forms of public communication: public rituals, literature, the arts and popular culture or 
entertainment, monuments, museums.90
Last not least, public culture is of course affected not only by deliberative forms of discursive 
communication, but also by simple factual information or news, as well as by experience. 
                                                          
89 Nor are these conceptions of national identity confined to a "nationalist" right. The left does not 
really deny that there is some kind of historical unity, based on cultural transmission and links 
between successive generations, transcending radical discontinuities of the political order. As 
indicated above, this understanding is an obvious, even if often implicit presupposition of the 
debates about the German past, of the demand that Germans have to learn from their history, have 
some kind of responsibility to draw consequences from their common past. See Habermas' 
interesting statement (in a "laudatio" for Daniel Goldhagen): "In Diskursen der 
Selbstverständigung, die durch Filme, Fernsehserien und Ausstellungen ebenso wie durch 
historische Darstellungen oder 'Affären' angeregt werden, streiten wir uns nicht über kurzfristige 
Ziele und Politiken, sondern über Formen des erwünschten politischen Zusuammenlebens, auch 
über Werte, die im politischen Gemeinwesen Vorrang haben sollen. Gleichzeitig geht es darum, in 
welchen Hinsichten wir uns als Bürger dieser Republik gegenseitig achten können - und als wer 
wir von anderen anerkannt werden möchten. Dafür bildet die nationale Geschichte einen wichtigen 
Hintergrund. Nationale Überlieferungen und Mentalitäten, die Teil unserer eigenen Person 
geworden sind, reichen nämlich weit hinter die Anfänge dieser Republik zurück. ... Vorausgesetzt, 
daß die jeweils lebenden Generationen in der Art ihres Denkens und Empfindens, in der Gestik 
des Ausdrucks und in der Weise ihrer Wahrnehmung über ein Gespinst kultureller Fäden mit 
Lebensform und Denkweise vergangener Generationen verknüpft sind..." (Habermas 1997). 
90 This is e.g. very evident in the ways in which "collective memory" is produced or transmitted, as the 
burgeoning literature on this phenomenon has demonstrated. 
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Even if mere news reporting or transmission of factual information is not in itself deliberative 
communication, news and information are of course a most important background or 
ingredient of deliberation. And to the role of experience: Many public beliefs can be tested in 
practice and thereby be affirmed or put into question. Public deliberation provides 
interpretations of frames for information and experiences, but it does not replace them. 
National socialism or communism were not primarily discredited by public deliberation - but 
first of all by experience with or information about their results (and in the case of National 
Socialism by the experiences of military defeat). But the interpretation of these experiences 
needed deliberation. It is not too easy to separate these influences in explaining cultural 
change. 
 
5.2 Some further questions and conjectures  
Despite these cautionary remarks, it seems plausible to assume that public deliberation is an 
important influence on the development of public culture, especially an important source of 
cultural change. On the other hand, public deliberation itself is not only regulated by the 
social and symbolic structures which were described above, but it is also influenced by public 
culture itself, which provides the background understandings, the resources and materials for 
deliberation.91 Here are some final conjectures about these interrelationships, especially 
about possible variations, which delineate topics for further research. 
− First, the question of differentiation or fragmentation again. This concerns both public 
culture and public deliberation. If public culture is to a certain degree articulated in and 
reproduced by public deliberation, then differences in public culture should be apparent in 
the differentiation of the debating public, and the segmentation of public deliberation 
should in turn produce differences in public culture. In public debates, different parts of the 
whole cultural repertoire are drawn upon, according to the differentiation of the public (in 
camps, issue publics, stratified layers, and special categories of participants). It is an 
important empirical question how much these segments of the public have in common and 
how loosely or tightly the various universes of discourse are linked by communication and 
the flow of ideas. The description of the main forms of differentiation gives some 
indications for possible connections (opposing camps, for instance, are to a certain 
degree oriented towards each other), but not very much is empirically known. The study of 
the differentiation of the public and the flows of public communications seems to be a 
promising way to find out how much common or shared public culture there is or to what 
degree culture is really segmented or fragmented. 
Some degree of differentiation of the sphere of public deliberation (into issue publics, 
camps and layers of participants which are stratified with respect to intensity of 
participation, authority and influence) is inevitable (Peters 1994). In large publics, not 
everybody can be heard, so a division into speakers and audiences is necessary. The 
range and complexity of issues which are publicly debated make some kind of 
specialization, some division of attention and concern necessary. The orientation towards 
camps is (among other things) a necessary way of cognitive simplification. But the degree 
                                                          
91 The symbolic structures of public deliberation might themselves be regarded as parts of public 
culture. This is a matter of terminology. 
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of differentiation and its specific forms is quite variable. Specific causes and effects of 
patterns of differentiation in the public sphere would be an important subject for research. 
Differentiation is not always segmentation or fragmentation, however. Segmentation or 
fragmentation exists if the members of different publics do not only have different beliefs 
or different concerns, but also do not talk much to each other, do not pay close attention 
to each other, but communicate primarily among themselves. The division into camps may 
mean that there is vigorous debate between camps or at least within each camp about the 
positions of the other. It can also mean that the members of different camps have only 
very rudimentary knowledge about each other, stick to simple stereotypes and do not take 
notice of the details of each other's positions. Only in the latter case do we have 
fragmentation. 
This also applies to stratification. By public "elites" we may understand parts of the public 
or particular publics with a very high degree of participation in public debate and a high 
degree of intellectual sophistication, demonstrated by the ability to understand or produce 
complex argumentations. Such elites can be influential elites or segmented elites. 
Influential elites are those who are opinion leaders for larger publics, who have a 
considerable influence on deliberations and beliefs within larger publics. Segmented elites 
debate mainly among themselves, do not have much influence on other publics, may have 
different concerns than the larger publics. Segmented public elites may be able to have 
some influence on other elites, especially political decision-makers, but this is not done by 
deliberation and opinion-making in larger publics. 
This is a rather simplified schema, but it may capture aspects of stratification in the public 
sphere which are meant when e.g. elite domination in public deliberation is criticized or 
the isolation of intellectual elites is lamented. It must be noted, however, that "intellectual" 
is just one category of speakers in public deliberation and that there might be other public 
elites (journalists, experts, advocates) with different characteristics.92 The concerns of 
intellectuals are often described as being detached from the concerns of a larger public.93 
In Germany, public debates with strong intellectual participation have rarely dealt with 
economic questions or matters of social policy in the last years. That may be indicative of 
                                                          
92 In this paper it was more or less taken for granted that the sphere of public deliberation is still 
basically a national phenomenon. We could regard national boundaries as another form of 
differentiation and ask, how open or closed to internatonal influences the national social spheres 
are. We could look at importation of TV content, for publication of books or articles by foreign 
authors, appearances of foreign speakers at meetings and conferences. We could also try to 
estimate the relative influence of foreign speakers and of ideas who originated in other countries. 
I would say that Germany would count as rather open to foreign contributions or influences (maybe 
less open than some smaller European countries, probably more open than France, the U.S. and 
Great Britain). There has been a range of intellectual imports from France in the post-war period, in 
several waves (existentialism, structuralism, post-structuralism). But this influence was confined 
mainly to the intellectual parts of the public. The main external influences or imports evidently came 
and still come from the United States (and to a much smaller extent from Britain). Some important 
topics of public debate have emerged under American influence. The 68 students movement was 
heavily influenced by the American civil rights and student movements, its issues (Vietnam) and 
tactics (civil disobedience). The same is true for gender issues, the environmental concerns of the 
70s, the more recent debates on issues of "multiculturalism", "difference" and "identity". Many 
arguments and positions on these issues have also been imported. This may partly have to do with 
the strong position of American political and moral philosophy and American social science. 
93 For the U.S., see Brint 1994; Rorty 1991; Jacoby 1987; Jacoby 1994. 
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a certain distance between the concerns of intellectuals and those of larger publics. It has 
also been suspected that German journalists are mostly oriented towards their own 
professional group or milieu, without much regard for the opinions and concerns of the 
larger public.94 But empirical evidence again is weak in all these cases. Since the 
examples touch upon the bigger question on the nature and distribution of intellectual 
influence and the role of elite culture in contemporary societies, it seems worthwhile to 
study these phenomena more closely. 
− Openness of public deliberation: We can imagine a field of public deliberation as being 
more or less conducive to the questioning or examination of beliefs, to the production of 
new arguments or new evidence, and to the acceptance of new arguments and evidence 
after examination. Parts of this phenomenon were already mentioned above as forms of 
"closure": the exclusion of participants from the sphere of deliberation, the denial of 
respect, either because viewpoints are seen as unreasonable or evil, or because the 
speakers are suspected of questionable motives or false consciousness. There are more 
ways, however, in which discussions can be restricted or closed. Orthodoxies or 
unquestioned authority can be maintained, unusual arguments or viewpoints ignored, 
misunderstood or distorted. There are elements of "doxa" in every discussion, of course. 
Not everything can be questioned in a given debate. But the degree of dogmatism might 
be quite variable. 
In part, this may depend on more general features of public culture: on the degree to 
which it generally relies on authority and unquestioned traditions, or the degree to which it 
encourages inquiry, questioning, inventiveness. A certain "reflexivity" of this kind is a 
general feature of most of modern culture, but it would be interesting to study its limits and 
variations in different contexts (changes over time, between countries, between issue 
areas).95 The degree of dogmatism might also be influenced not just by the general 
culture, but by specific cultural milieus, features of issue publics or camps, and it might be 
influenced by social structures - for instance by the degree of polarization or hostility 
between camps or by structures of stratification. 
The question of openness can also be posed with respect to the selection of topics. 
Selection is always necessary, of course, because the capacity of public deliberation is 
limited (even if quite variable given the differentiation into issue publics which specialize 
on certain topics - a kind of "division of deliberative labour"). But are there systematic 
biases, blind spots, exclusions of topics, denials of problems, selection of issues not as a 
result of open competition and discussion, but determined by hidden influences. Since 
"bias" is a counterfactual notion here and would have to be measured by some standard 
of open or unbiased selection of issues, this is again a very difficult question. But it 
                                                          
94 For the German case, see Kepplinger 1979. For an empirical critique of these assumptions, see 
Schönbach, Stürzebrecher, Schneider 1994. 
95 There have been various criticisms of modern culture in this respect: the thesis of a dominance of 
"instrumental rationality", i.e. the dominance of empirical or pragmatic discourse over normative 
discourse, or criticisms of other one-sided notions of rationality or of "enlightenment 
fundamentalism" - the unwillingness to question certain basic features of the modernist worldview. 
But so far these suspicions have rarely been studied empirically in the area of public discourse. 
(The thesis of a dominance of "instrumental rationality" seems somewhat questionable empirically, 
for instance.) 
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certainly seems worthwhile to ponder over it, especially since statements of selection bias 
are often made in public debate (e.g. the claim the Nazi past has been "repressed" in 
German public debates in the 50s or similar claims about collective historical amnesia in 
other countries).96
In this context, another diagnosis would have to be considered too: the thesis, that not 
biased selection of issues, but the lack of selectivity is the problem (Klapp 1978) - that the 
agenda of public deliberation is overcrowded, that there is too much "noise", a lack of 
discrimination between important and less important issues, and a corresponding diffusion 
of attention, lack of orientation and disappearance of meaningful common debates. 
− Orientation towards consensus: Is public deliberation oriented towards consent or 
agreement? Do spheres of public deliberation differ in this respect - are there more 
contentious and more consensual publics? In Germany, there has been some excited 
debate on this point, especially in connection with Habermas' notion of discourse (where 
the goal of reasoned agreement is treated as a necessary presupposition of participants 
in "true" discourse) (Giegel 1992). Now sociologists after Parsons tend to favour conflict 
over consensus. Consensus smacks of a too harmonious picture of society, and also of 
conformity.97 And of course "orientation to consensus" could be understood as pressure to 
conform and discouragement of dissent.98 These suspicions can hardly be justified in the 
case of Habermas, who merely claimed that we cannot seriously speak of a serious 
discussion unless the opponents make a sincere effort to convince each other by 
reasoned argument and let themselves be convinced in this way. 
But how often is such an attitude actually found in public disputes? And how often are 
disputes resolved by reasoned agreement, when one side or all sides admit that they 
were at least partially wrong, and that a certain position has been most convincingly 
supported and therefore has to be accepted? 
In public debates, this style sometimes occurs when issues are very unsettled, when they 
do not fit into existing frames, cannot easily be linked to existing camps and partisanships. 
But most of the time the debate is more advocatory. Arguments are not primarily directed 
to opponents with the aim to convince them, but to an audience, to the by-standers, or 
even to the members of one's own camp. The triadic structure of much of public 
communication, where speakers do not primarily talk to other speakers, but to an 
audience, often a mass media audience, and where speakers are often not even co-
                                                          
96 There is a considerable literature on "agenda setting", relating to the mass media or the agenda of 
political decision making. In this literature, various paths in which issues get on the public agenda 
are described (top down, bottom up and so on), and the roles of collective actors and institutions 
(mass media organizations, government and administration, parties, movements) and of categories 
of participants are considered. Sometimes, more general factors which give certain issues a 
comparative advantage over others in the competition for public attention ("news values") are also 
considered. Finally, typical "career paths" of issues following their appearance on the public 
agenda are described. This seems an interesting and useful research perspective, not least with 
respect to the question of possible bias or, more generally, with respect to the selectivity of public 
deliberation. For reasons of time and space, I cannot discuss this research in more detail here. 
97 There is also the criticism that modern societies do not have to depend on consensus for social 
order or integration. But that's another matter. 
98 It is in this sense, I think, that Japan is sometimes described as a society oriented towards 
consensus. 
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present, either in one room or on the same page, supports this style (Gerhards, Neidhardt 
1991; Staab 1991). 
There is also no social pressure to reach agreement (as in most situations when practical 
decisions have to be made, or in closer circles or milieus, when unresolved disagreement 
may be disturbing). On the contrary, speakers live by disagreement and dissidence. There 
is usually not even a need to strive for majority support. Often, primarily the approval of 
smaller audiences, of certain circles or one's own camp is sought. Competition for the 
intellectual and moral leadership of a camp often puts a premium on intransigence, or on 
the demonstration of peculiar sensibilities and moral sensitivities. Speakers have to 
present themselves as stout defenders of the values they represent. They have to prove 
acute powers of observation and diagnosis. All this often leads to a style that is not only 
somewhat dramatic, but also accusatory. And this is normally not conducive to reaching 
agreement beyond one's own circle or camp. 
Should we conclude that there is small chance for real discussion or argument? This 
would be premature. There are still norms and practices of civility, of respect for 
opponents, of duties to listen and to acknowledge criticism. There is often a moderating 
influence of neutral or less partisan publics. To be the intellectual leader of a camp is not 
the only attractive position for speakers. There is also the role of the independent mind or 
that of the neutral arbiter. Contending arguments often cannot simply be ignored if they 
get into public circulation. They have to be answered directly or indirectly. 
Agreements are often reached in an indirect way, not by public concessions and 
acknowledgements. Some ideas gain influence, others become obsolete, discredited or 
only slowly forgotten. And debates which do not lead to any convincing solution still might 
show the difficulties or uncertainties, clarify some aspects, rule out some bad arguments, 
even support a readiness to compromise and to continue the search for a resolution (van 
den Daele 1996). 
So orientation towards consensus in debates and the degrees of consensus after some 
debates might not be the most useful variables. Instead, we should look for forms or 
degrees of civility, the complexity of arguments, the openness for or anticipation of 
criticism or doubt (even if only implicit, without explicit reference to opposing positions). 
And we should look at changes in public culture which can be linked to the diffusion of 
certain arguments by way of public deliberation, and the loss of credibility of other 
arguments through criticism and counterargument, and not at some acknowledged 
consensus. 
   50 
Literature 
Alexander, Jeffrey C.; Colomy, Paul (eds.), 1990: Differentiation Theory and Social Change: 
Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Apter, David E. (ed.), 1964: Ideology and Discontent. Glencoe, IL: Free Press/Macmillan. 
Beaud, Paul; Panese, Francesco, 1995: „From One Galaxy to Another: The Trajectories of 
French Intellectuals“, Media, Culture & Society 17(3), 385-412. 
Birnbaum, Pierre (ed.), 1997: Sociologie des nationalismes. Paris: PUF. 
Boudon, Raymond, 1981: „L'intellectuel et ses publics: les singularités francaises“ In: 
Reynaud, Grafmeyer, 465-480. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, 1984: „La hit-parade des intellectuels français, ou qui sera juge de la 
légitimité des juges“ Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 52-53, 95-100. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, 1989: „The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of Intellectuals in the 
Modern World“, Telos 81, Fall 1989, 99-110. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, 1994: „L'emprise du journalisme“, Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales 101-02, 3-9. 
Brint, Steven, 1994: In an Age of Experts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Brubaker, Rogers. 1992: Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany and France. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Brunkhorst, Hauke, 1997: „Die hohe Warte der Kulturkritik“, Die Zeit 42, 10. Okt. 1997, 66.    
Buchstein, Hubertus, 1996: „Bittere Bytes: Cyberbürger und Demokratietheorie“, Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 44(4), 1996, 583-607.     
Budge, Ian; Farlie, D.J., 1983: Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party 
Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies.  London: Allen & Unwin. 
Calhoun, Craig (ed.), 1992: Habermas and the Public Sphere. Boston: MIT Press  
Cohen, Joshua, 1989: „Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy“ In: Hamlin, Pettit, 18-34. 
Converse, Philip E., 1964: „The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics“ In: Apter 1964, 
206-261. 
Coser, Lewis A., 1973: „The Intellectual as Celebrity“, Dissent 20, 45-46.     
Crane, Diana, 1996: „Reconceptualizing the Public Sphere: The Electronic Media and the 
Public“ In: Honegger et al., 175-195.     
Devine, Donald J., 1970: The Attentive Public. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Donsbach, Wolfgang, 1993: „Journalismus versus journalism - ein Vergleich zum Verhältnis 
von Medien und Politik in Deutschland und den USA“ In: Donsbach et al., 283-315.     
Donsbach, Wolfgang et al., 1993: Beziehungsspiele - Medien und Politik in der öffentlichen 
Diskussion. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Downing, John D.H., 1988: „The Alternative Public Realm: The Organization of the 1980s 
Anti-Nuclear Press in West Germany and Britain“, Media, Culture and Society 2, 163-182. 
Downs, Anthony, 1972: „Up and Down with Ecology - The 'Issue-Attention Cycle', The Public 
Interest 28, Summer 1972, 38-50.     
Elkins, David J.. 1993: Manipulation and Consent: How Voters and Leaders Manage 
Complexity. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Fishkin, James, 1991: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press  
Galtung, Johan; Ruge, Mari Holmboe, 1965: „The Structure of Foreign News. The 
Presentation of the Congo“, Cuba Journal of Peace Research 2, 64-91.     
   51
Gamson, Joshua, 1994: Claims to Fame: Celebrity in Contemporary America. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
Gamson, William A.; Modigliani, Andre, 1987: „The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action“, 
Research in Political Sociology 3, 1987, 137-177.     
Gans, Herbert, 1979: Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly 
News, Newsweek, and Time. New York: Pantheon.  
Gans, Herbert, 1985: „Are U.S. Journalists Dangerously Liberal?“, Columbia Journalism 
Review, Dec. 1985, 29-33.     
Gerhards, Jürgen, 1992: „Politische Veranstaltungen in der Bundesrepublik“, Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 44(4), 766-779.    
Gerhards, Jürgen, 1994: „Politische Öffentlichkeit. Ein system- und akteurstheoretischer 
Bestimmungsversuch“ In: Neidhardt, 77-105. 
Gerhards, Jürgen, 1995: „Framing Dimensions and Framing Strategies: Contrasting Ideal- 
and Real-Type Frames“, Social Science Information 34, 225-248.     
Gerhards, Jürgen, 1996: „Soziale Positionierung und politische Kommunikation am Beispiel 
der öffentlichen Debatte über Abtreibung“ In: van den Daele, Neidhardt, 83-102.     
Gerhards, Jürgen; Neidhardt, Friedhelm, 1991: „Strukturen und Funktionen moderner 
Öffentlichkeit. Fragestellungen“ In: Müller-Dohm, Neumann-Braun, 31-90.     
Giegel, Hans-Joachim (Hrsg.), 1992: Kommunikation und Konsens in modernen 
Gesellschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Giesen, Bernhard, 1983: „Moralische Unternehmer und öffentliche Kommunikation. 
Überlegungen zur gesellschaftlichen Thematisierung moralischer Probleme“, Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 230-254.     
Günther, Klaus, 1988: Der Sinn für Angemessenheit. Anwendungsdiskurse in Moral und 
Recht. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1981: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. 2 Bde. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp.  
Habermas, Jürgen, 1989: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1990: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Neuaufl. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1997: „Geschichte ist ein Teil von uns. Warum ein "Demokratiepreis" für 
Daniel J. Goldhagen? Eine Laudatio“, Die Zeit Nr. 12, 14. März 1997, 13.     
Hamlin, Alan; Pettit, Philip (eds.), 1989: The Good Polity. Normative Analysis of the State. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Héritier, Adrienne (Hrsg.), 1994: „Policy-Analyse“, PVS Sonderband 24. Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag.  
Hilgartner, Steven, 1990: „The Dominant View of Popularization: Conceptual Problems, 
Political Uses“, Social Studies of Science 20, 1990, 519-539.     
Honegger, Claudia et al. (Hrsg.). 1996: Gesellschaften im Umbau. Konflikte, Identitäten, 
Differenzen. Zürich: Seismos.  
Jacoby, Russell, 1987: The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe. New 
York: Basic Books.  
Jacoby, Russell, 1994: Dogmatic Wisdom: How the Culture Wars Divert Education and 
Distract America. New York: Doubleday. 
Kadushin, Charles, 1975: The American Intellectual Elite. Boston: Little, Brown. 
   52 
Kandiah, David Michael; Seldon, Anthony (eds.), 1996: Ideas and Think Tanks in 
Contemporary Britain. Vol. 1. London: Cass.  
Katz, Elihu, 1996: „And Deliver Us from Segmentation“, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 546, 22-33.    
Katz, Elihu; Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 1955: Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the 
Flow of Mass Communications. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.  
Kepplinger, Hans Mathias, 1979: „Angepaßte Außenseiter. Ergebnisse und Interpretationen 
der Kommunikationsforschung“ In: Kepplinger, 7-28.     
Kepplinger, Hans Mathias (Hrsg.); 1979: Angepaßte Außenseiter. Was Journalisten denken 
und wie sie arbeiten. Freiburg/München: Alber. 
Klapp, Orrin E., 1978: Opening and Closing: Strategies of Information Adaptation in Society. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
Knight, Jack; Johnson, James, 1994: „Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of 
Democratic Legitimacy“, Political Theory 22(2), 277-296.     
Köcher, Renate, 1986: „Missionaries and Bloodhounds: Role Definitions of British and 
German Journalists“, European Journal of Communication 1(1), 43-64.     
Koopmans, Ruud, 1996: „New Social Movements and Changes in Political Participation in 
Western Europe“, West European Politics 19(1), 28-50.     
Koopmans, Ruud; Kriesi, Hanspeter, 1997: „Citoyenneté, identité nationale et mobilisation de 
l'extrême droite“ In: Birnbaum, 295-324. 
Lamont, Michèle, 1987: „How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of 
Jacques Derrida“, American Journal of Sociology 93, 584-622.     
Langer, Susanne K., 1957: Philosophy in New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, 
Rite and Art. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Luskin, Robert C., 1987: „Measuring Political Sophistication“, American Journal of Political 
Science 31, 856-899. 
Manin, Bernard, 1987: „On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation“, Political Theory 15, 1987, 
338-368.     
Markus, M.L., 1987: „Toward a "Critical Mass" Theory of Interactive Media. Universal Access, 
Interdependence, and Diffusion“, Communications Research 14, 491-511. 
Mayhew, Leon H., 1990: „The Differentiation of the Solidary Public“ In: Alexander, Colomy, 
294-322.     
Müller-Doohm, Stefan; Neumann-Braun, Klaus (Hrsg.), 1991: Öffentlichkeit. Kultur. 
Massenkommunikation. Oldenburg: bis. 
Neidhardt, Friedhelm (Hrsg.), 1994: „Öffentlichkeit, öffentliche Meinung, soziale 
Bewegungen“, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 34, 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.  
Nullmeier, Frank; Rüb, Friedbert W., 1993: Die Transformation der Sozialpolitik. Vom 
Sozialstaat zum Sicherungsstaat. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.  
Page, Benjamin I., 1996: Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy. Chicago: 
Chicago UP. 
Page, Benjamin I.; Shapiro, Robert Y., 1992: The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in 
American Policy Preferenes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Parsons, Talcott, 1967: „On the Concept of Influence“ In: Parsons, 355-383.     
Parsons, Talcott, 1967a: Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New York: Free Press.  
Peters, Bernhard, 1994: Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit. In: Neidhardt, 42-76.     
Peters, Birgit, 1995: Prominenz. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.  
   53
Pinto, Louis, 1994: „Le journalisme philosophique“, Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales 101-02, 25-38.     
Reese-Schäfer, Walter, 1996: „Zeitdiagnose als wissenschaftliche Aufgabe“, Berliner Journal 
für Soziologie 6(3), 377-390.     
Reynaud, J.D.; Grafmeyer, Y., 1981: Francais, qui êtes-vous? Paris: Documentation 
francaise.  
Ricci, David M., 1992: The Transformation of American Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.  
Rieff, Philip, 1973: The Triumph of the Therapeutic. Harmondworth: Penguin Books.  
Roper, Elmo, 1955: „Foreword“ In: Katz, Lazarsfeld, xv-xx.     
Rorty, Richard, 1991: „Intellectuals in Politics“, Dissent, Fall 1991, 483-490.     
Rothman, Stanley; Lichter, Robert S.; Lichter, Linda, 1991: Elites in Conflict: Social Change 
in America Today. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Schenk, Michael; Rössler, Patrick, 1994: „Das unterschätzte Publikum. Wie 
Themenbewußtsein und politische Meinungsbildung im Alltag von Massenmedien und 
interpersonaler Kommunikation beeinflusst werden“ In: Neidhardt, 261-295.     
Schnapper, Dominique, 1995: „The Idea of Nation“, Qualitative Sociology 18, 177-187.     
Schön, Donald A.; Rein, Martin, 1994: Frame Reflection. New York: Basic Books. 
Schönbach, Klaus; Stürzebrecher, Dieter; Schneider, Beate, 1994: „Oberlehrer und 
Missionare?“ In: Neidhardt, 139-161.     
Sirinelli, Jean-Francois, 1996: Intellectuels et passions francaises: Manifestes et pétitions au 
XXe siècle.  Paris: Gallimard.  
Smith, James Allen, 1991: The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy 
Elite. New York: Free Press. 
Soley, Lawrence C., 1992: The News Shapers. New York: Praeger.  
Staab, Joachim Friedrich, 1990: Nachrichtenwert-Theorie. 2. Aufl. Freiburg/München: Alber.  
Staab, Joachim Friedrich, 1991: „Struktur eines publizistischen Konflikts“, Kölner Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 43, 70-85.    
Stone, Diane, 1996: „From the Margins of Politics: the Influence of Think-Tanks in Britain“, 
West European Politics 19(4), 675-692.     
van den Daele, Wolfgang, 1996: „Objektives Wissen als politische Ressource: Experten und 
Gegenexperten im Diskurs“ In: van den Daele, Neidhardt, 297-326.     
van den Daele, Wolfgang; Neidhardt, Friedhelm (Hrsg.), 1996: Kommunikation und 
Entscheidung. Berlin: edition sigma.  
Vick, D.W.; Macpherson, L., 1997: „An Opportunity Lost: the United Kingdom's Failed Reform 
of Defamation Law“, Federal Communications Law Journal 49(3), 621-653.     
Wewer, Göttrik, 1989: „Politikwissenschaft und Zeitdiagnose in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland“, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 46, 32-45.     
Wittkämper, Gerhard W. (Hrsg.), 1992: Medien und Politik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft. 
Wittkämper, Gerhard W.; Bellers, Jürgen; Grimm, Jürgen; Heiks, Michael et al., 1992: 
„Pressewirkungen und außenpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse - Methodologische 
Probleme der Analyse“ In: Wittkämper, 150-168.     
Zitelmann, Rainer; Weißmann, Karlheinz; Grossheim, Michael (Hrsg.), 1993: West-Bindung. 
Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main/Berlin: Ullstein.  
 
